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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Appellate Court err in failing to enforce the 
mandatory joinder of a necessary party required by Rule 19(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure? 
2. Did the Appellate Court err in deciding that as a matter 
of law an obligee who authorizes a co-obligee to enforce their 
joint claim is not subject to the mandatory joinder requirements 
of Rule 19 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
3. Did the Appellate Court err in concluding that the 
district court's failure to properly analyze the issue of joinder 
under Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedures, was harmless error. 
REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF ANY OPINIONS ISSUED BY COURT OF APPEALS 
Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941 (Utah App. 1989). 
JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT 
On March 2, 1989, Appellant petitioned this Court for a Writ 
of Certiorari to review a decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
entered on January 12, 1989. That decision affirmed the district 
court's granting of Partial Summary Judgment against Appellant. 
On January 31, 1989, the Utah Court of Appeals entered an order 
denying Appellant's Petition for Rehearing. This Court granted 
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Appellant's petition and issued a Writ of Certiorari on July 12, 
1989. The provisions of Section 78-2-2(3)(a) and Section 78-2-
2(5), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, confer on this Court 
jurisdiction to review the decision in question by Writ of 
Certiorari• 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
RULE 17. Parties plaintiff and defendant. 
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be 
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An 
executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an 
express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract 
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party 
authorized by statute may sue in his own name without joining 
with him the party for whose benefit the action is brought; 
and when a statute so provides, an action for the use or 
benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state 
of Utah. No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it 
is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest 
until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for 
ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or 
substitution of, the real party in interest; and such 
ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same 
effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the 
real party in interest. 
RULE 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication. 
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is 
subject to service of process and whose joinder will not 
deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of 
action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his 
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already 
parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject 
of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the 
action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or 
impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any 
of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk 
of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not 
been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. 
If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may 
be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary 
plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his 
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joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he 
shall be dismissed from the action. 
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not 
feasible. If a person as described in Subdivision (a)(1)-(2) 
hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine 
whether in equity and good conscience the action should 
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, 
the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The 
factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what 
extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be 
prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the 
extent to which , by protective provisions in the judgment, 
by the shaping of relief, or other measure, the prejudice can 
be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in 
the person's absence will be adequate; fourth whether the 
plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is 
dismissed for nonjoinder. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 11, 1986, Appellant and Sidney and Theresa Seftel 
(Seftels) initiated a civil action against Capital City Bank in the 
Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
In that action they sought a declaration of their liabilities under 
guaranty agreements which they executed in favor of Capital City 
Bank (Capital) and the Small Business Administration (SBA) as joint 
obligees. R. 2-21. The guaranty agreements were executed as part 
of an SBA guaranteed loan between Capital and Bagel Nosh 
Intermountain, Ltd. (Bagel Nosh). 
The SBA guaranteed loan was obtained by Bagel Nosh to provide 
construction financing for the opening of a Bagel Nosh restaurant 
in Park City, Utah. Appellant and the Seftels were the majority 
shareholders and principals of Bagel Nosh. On November 8, 1984, 
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Bagel Nosh filed a petition for relief from creditors under Chapter 
11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. 11 USC Section 1101 et 
seq. 
On April 7# 1986, Capital filed its answer and counterclaim 
in which it sought entry of a judgment against the Appellant and 
Seftels for the principal sum of $265,848.07 plus interest and the 
entry of judgment declaring that the guaranties and associated 
trust deeds were valid obligations of Appellant and the Seftels and 
that the trust deeds be judicially foreclosed and the real property 
covered thereby sold as provided by law. R. 24-45. 
On July 25, 1986, Capital filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
in which it sought dismissal of Appellant's complaint and judgment 
as prayed on its counterclaim. R. 79-99, 100-102. On February 4, 
1987, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision granting 
Capital the requested relief. R. 308-313. On May 20, 1987, the 
district court entered a Partial Final Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure against Appellant and Seftels. R. 378-384. On June 
4, 1987r the Appellant and Seftels filed their Notice of Appeal 
from that judgment to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
On July 23, 1987, the Utah Supreme Court assigned the case to 
the Utah Court of Appeals. Following oral argument, on January 12, 
1989, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's 
judgment. On January 26, 1989, appellants filed a Petition for 
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Rehearing before the Court of Appeals which was denied on January 
31# 1989. 
On March 2, 1989 Appellant filed a petition for Writ of 
Certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court, On June 12, 1989 this 
Court granted Appellant's petition and issued its Writ of 
Certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about November 15, 1979, Bagel Nosh applied for a 
SBA guaranteed loan with Capital in the amount of $300,000. Under 
the terms of that loan, which is governed by Title 13 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations, the SBA agreed to participate in the loan 
and guaranteed ninety percent (90%) of the outstanding obligation 
to Capital. R. 187. At the time Bagel Nosh applied for the loan, 
Appellant and the Seftels were the majority stockholders and 
principals of Bagel Nosh. As part of the loan transaction, 
Appellant and the Seftels were required to execute personal 
guaranties presented on SBA's Form 148 and issue trust deeds on 
condominiums the parties owned in Snowbird, Utah, as security for 
the guaranties. 
2. On December 24, 1979, the SBA guaranteed loan was approved 
and a loan agreement and promissory note executed by Bagel Nosh in 
favor of Capital. R. 105-106. 
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3. The proceeds of the loan were used by Bagel Nosh for the 
construction and equipping of a Bagel Nosh restaurant in Park City, 
Utah. 
4. Under the terms of the Form 148 guaranties, Appellant and 
the Seftels agreed to guaranty payment of the total loan amount to 
the SBA and Capital as joint obligees. R. 129, 133. As additional 
collateral for the loan, Bagel Nosh granted Capital a security 
interest in all its equipment and assets. 
5. Following disbursement of the loan proceeds, Bagel Nosh 
constructed its restaurant facilities and began operations. 
Appellant is not a resident of the State of Utah and did not have 
any responsibility for the management or operation of the 
restaurant. As with any start up company, Bagel Nosh experienced 
its share of problems and went into default on its payments to 
Capital• 
6. Bagel Nosh's initial default on the obligation led to the 
restructuring of the agreement between the parties. The 
restructuring was reduced to writing in a document entitled Loan 
Restructure Agreement, dated March 30, 1983. R. 137. That 
agreement provided for modification of the original loan agreement 
and included, among other things, reduction of the principal 
amount, repayment of past due amounts, and that Sidney Seftel and 
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Michael Landes personally guaranty Capital's loan to the borrower 
and provide the bank with current personal financial statements on 
a yearly basis. 
7. After experiencing continuing financial problems, on 
November 8# 1984, Bagel Nosh filed a petition for relief under 
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. R. 187. As a 
debtor-in-possession, Bagel Nosh continued for a period of time to 
make payments to Capital pursuant to the terms of the Loan 
Restructure Agreement. 
8. In an effort to protect their interests, Appellant and the 
Seftels initiated the present action against Capital to determine 
the existence and extent if any of their liability as guarantors 
of the Bagel Nosh obligation. In response to Plaintiff's 
complaint, Capital filed a counterclaim under which it sought 
enforcement of the original Form 148 guaranty agreements. 
9. Following limited discovery by Appellant, on July 25, 
1986, Capital filed its Motion for Summary Judgment against 
Appellant and the Seftels. 
10. In response to Capital's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Appellant filed a Reply Memorandum in which it asserted that 
Capital had failed to join the SBA, an indispensable party, in its 
attempted enforcement of the original guaranty agreements. R. 208-
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222. 
11. On February 4, 1987, Third Judicial District Court Judge 
Timothy R. Hanson issued a Memorandum Decision granting Summary 
Judgment in favor of Capital on all issues. R. 308-313. On the 
issue of the joinder of the SBA, Judge Hanson explained: 
"Plaintiffs have further alleged that an indispensable party, the 
Small Business Administration, has not been joined. That defense 
is without merit. In the first instance, the defense has not been 
pled, but additionally, the SBA is not under the present 
interpretation of the Rules of Procedure an indispensable party to 
this action." R. 311. 
12. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals recognized that the 
SBA was a ninety percent (90%) participating lender and that the 
guaranties which formed the basis of Appellant's liability were 
executed on SBA forms in favor of both the SBA and Capital as "co-
lenders." Seftel v. Capital City Bank. 767 P.2d at 943. 
13. Following entry of the district court's partial final 
judgment and decree of foreclosure, on June 4, 1987, Appellant and 
the Seftels filed a Notice of Appeal and posted a supersedeas bond 
in the total amount of the judgment, plus interest. 
14. While the present appeal was before the Court of Appeals, 
on March 17, 1988, the Seftels filed for relief under Chapter 7 of 
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the United States Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the District of Utah# Central Division. On November 17, 
1986, the Bagel Nosh bankruptcy was converted to a liquidation 
proceeding under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. On April 15, 
1987, an order was executed by the United States Bankruptcy Judge 
closing the estate of Bagel Nosh. 
15. On January 12, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued its 
decision. In its opinion the Court of Appeals agreed that the 
district court committed error in its analysis of the joinder of 
the SBA but concluded that the fact the SBA had given Capital 
written authorization to enforce the obligation rendered the error 
harmless• 
16. The condominium pledged by the Seftels as collateral for 
their guaranty was subject to a first mortgage loan from Crossland 
Savings. Following the filing of the Seftels' bankruptcy petition, 
they went in default in relation to that obligation and the first 
mortgage lender issued notice of a foreclosure sale of the property 
for February 23, 1989. Prior to the Seftels' bankruptcy, Appellant 
had obtained a third mortgage interest in the condominium to secure 
his contribution to the issuance of the supersedeas bond. On 
February 10, 1989, Capital filed a motion in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court to stop the scheduled foreclosure. On February 
21, 1989, the Bankruptcy Court denied Capital's motion. 
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17. Following the denial of its motion to stop the 
foreclosure sale, on February 22, 1989, Capital and the SBA entered 
into an agreement whereby the SBA purchased the first mortgage 
interest, substituted itself as trustee, and proceeded with the 
foreclosure sale. On the morning of February 23, 1989, Appellant 
brought a motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order 
on for hearing before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson in the 
present case. At that hearing, the SBA contested the motion by 
relying, in part, on the fact that it was not a party in the action 
and therefore not subject to the Court's jurisdiction or the stay 
imposed by the supersedeas bond which had filed in the action. 
18. Following the district court's denial of Appellant's 
motion for a temporary restraining order on February 23, 1989, the 
SBA proceeded with the foreclosure and sold the Seftel's 
condominium to Capital. The SBA's sale of the property eliminated 
Appellant's junior lien position in respect to that property. 
19. Appellant filed his petition for Writ of Certiorari with 
this Court on March 2, 1989. Appellant's petition was granted by 
the Court on June 12, 1989. 
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ARGUMENT 
JOINDER OF THE SBA AS A NECESSARY PARTY 
IS MANDATORY 
Rule 19 U.R.C.P. provides that a necessary party who is 
subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive 
the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action 
shall be joined as a party in the action. Thus, the joinder of a 
necessary party is mandatory if that party is subject to service 
of process and joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction. 
See Intermountain Phy. Med, v. Micro-Dex, 739 P.2d 1131 (Utah App. 
1987); State v. Dist. Court of Fifth Jud. Dist. 742 P.2d 464, 467 
(Mont. 1987); Hedrick v. Hedrick, 368 S.E.2d 14, 17 (N.C. App. 
1988); Prutch Bros. TV v. Crow Watson No. 8, 732 P.2d 241, 243 
(Colo. App. 1986) ("[Rule] 19(a) is mandatory, and requires the 
trial court to join persons falling within its provisions, if 
feasible.") 
The absence of a necessary party is fundamental and 
jurisdictional Vitale v. City of Kansas City, 701 S.W.2d 213 (Mo. 
App. 1985). The mandatory nature of Rule 19(a) has lead some 
Courts to hold that an order entered in the absence of a necessary 
party is void. See Chariot Holding, Ltd. v. Eastmet Corp., 505 
N.E.2d 1076, 1084 (111. App. 1 dist, 1987); Zurich Insurance 
Company v. Ravmark Industries, Inc., 494 N.E.2d 630, 632-633 (111. 
App. 1 Dist. 1986). As the Appellate Court of Illinois explained 
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in In re Adoption of Ledbetter, 465 N.E.wd 962, 964 (111. App. 4 
Dist. 1984): 
The requirement of joinder of necessary parties is 
absolute and inflexible. (citation omitted) Both the trial 
and appellate court have a duty to enforce this principle of 
law sua sponte when it is brought to their attention, 
(citation omitted) An order entered without jurisdiction over 
a necessary party is null and void. 
This court recognized the jurisdictional nature of the rule 
in Hilts ley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1987). In Hilts lev, the 
Court raised the issue of the joinder of a necessary party, sua 
sponte, and reversed and remanded the case with instructions that 
a necessary party be joined in the action pursuant to the directive 
of Rule 19(a). See also Vitale v. City of Kansas City, 701 S.W.2d 
at 215. 
The Appellate Court's decision in the present case stands in 
direct contradiction to this Court's decision in Hiltsley. In the 
present case, the Appellate Court agreed with Appellant's 
contention that the district court committed error by not following 
the analytical steps required by Rule 19. Seftel v. Capital City 
Bank, 767 P.2d at 945. In describing the analysis dictated by Rule 
19, the Appellate Court explained: 
Pursuant to subsection (a), "a court must first determine 
whether an absent party has sufficient interest in the action 
to make it a necessary party," considering the criteria set 
forth in the rule." Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d at 
945, (quoting from Manyooats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 558 
(10th Cir. 1977)). 
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The Appellate Court correctly observed that pursuant to 
subsection (a) of Rule 19, a court must first determine whether an 
absent party has sufficient interest in the action to make it a 
necessary party• Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d at 945. 
However, the Court of Appeals continued its analysis by explaining: 
If, after the appropriate analysis, a party is deemed 
"necessary," a court must then proceed to subsection (b), and 
determine whether the party is indispensable,... Seftel v. 
Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d at 945. 
This interpretation of Rule 19 overlooks a critical step in 
the overall analysis. Before a court proceeds to a determination 
of whether or not a necessary party is indispensable, that court 
must determine if the necessary party can be joined in the 
litigation. The factors presented in Rule 19(b) should be applied 
only if joinder of the necessary party is not feasible. Withinaton 
v. Cloud, 522 So.2d 263, 264 (Ala. 1988). 
If a party is deemed to be necessary and can be joined in the 
action, then joinder is mandatory under Rule 19(a). See Prutch 
Bros. TV v. Crow Watson No, 8, 732 P.2d at 243. See also J & B 
Slurry Seal v. Mid-South Aviation, 362 S.E.2d 812, 822 (N.C. App. 
1987). This Court in Hilts ley and the Court of Appeals in 
Intermountain Phv. Med, v. Micro-Dex, 739 P.2d 1131 (Utah App. 
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1987) recognized and enforced the mandatory joinder requirement of 
Rule 19(a). 
After explaining its interpretation of the two step process 
provided by Rule 19, the Court of Appeals proceeded to analyze the 
question of the SBA's status as "indispensable" under Rule 19(b) 
and concluded that based on the undisputed facts before the court, 
the SBA was not an indispensable party. Seftel v. Capital City 
Bank, 767 P.2d at 946. By addressing the issue of whether or not 
the SBA was an indispensable party, the Appellate Court implicitly 
recognized SBA's status as a necessary party under Rule 19(a). 
The Appellate Court's failure to consider whether or not the SBA 
could be joined as a necessary party in the action constitutes 
reversible error. 
It should be noted that pursuant to federal statute the SBA 
by and through its administrator may sue and be sued in any court 
of a state having general jurisdiction. 15 USC Section 634(b)(1). 
Therefore, the SBA can be joined in the present action. 
By failing to require the joinder of the SBA as a necessary 
party, the Appellate Court overlooked the mandatory joinder 
requirements of Rule 19 and committed reversible error. 
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THE SBA IS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST 
AS TO NINETY PERCENT OF THE OBLIGATION AND 
THEREFORE A NECESSARY PARTY 
In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, counsel for 
Capital represented to the trial court that the SBA had no legal 
interest in the guaranties which form the basis for the Appellant's 
potential liability. Capital continued to advance this position 
before the Court of Appeals. See Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 
P.2d at 946. 
There is no question that as a participating lender, the SBA 
has a significant interest in the present action. Respondent's 
representations to the contrary are unsupported by the record and 
simply not true. Throughout these proceedings, counsel for 
Respondent has misstated the record or failed to accurately present 
the facts. 
For example, in Respondent's brief in opposition to 
Appellant's petition, Capital stated: MIn the instant case, the 
district court found that the SBA was not necessary to this 
action". (Brief of Respondent in Opposition to the Petition for 
a Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals, P. 6.) At no 
time in these proceedings has the district court entered a finding 
that the SBA was not necessary to this action. In fact the 
district court has failed to make any findings on the issue of 
joinder. (See footnote #7). 
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Respondent now argues that the SBA has no interest in the 
obligation and does not have a direct claim or cause of action 
against Appellant. (Brief of Respondent in Opposition to the 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, p. 10.) As a participating 
lender and joint obligee on the guaranty agreements, the SBA has 
both an interest in the present action and a cause of action 
against Appellant. If the SBA had no interest in the obligation, 
why would it provide Capital with a written authorization to sue 
on the guaranties? 
In fact, in a recent proceeding before the district court in 
which Appellant sought to enjoin Capital and the SBA from 
foreclosing the collateral pledged as security for the Seftels' 
guaranty, the SBA admitted that it had an interest in the action.1 
Pursuant to separate agreement between the SBA and Capital, 
on February 22, 1989, the SBA purchased the first mortgage holder's 
interest in the collateral pledged by the Seftels in this case. 
Notwithstanding the existence of a supersedeas bond in the full 
amount of the present judgment, Capital and the SBA entered into 
an agreement whereby the SBA purchased the first mortgage interest 
on the eve of its scheduled foreclosure and the SBA proceeded at 
the foreclosure sale to sell the property to Capital. Based in 
part upon the representation of Capital's counsel that it had 
nothing to do with the SBA's actions, the District Court denied 
Appellant's motion for a temporary restraining order and allowed 
the sale to proceed. In its answer to a subsequent lawsuit between 
the parties, Capital admitted that it had in fact entered into an 
agreement with the SBA concerning the transaction. By foreclosure 
of its junior lien position, Appellant has been harmed by the 
concerted actions of the SBA and Capital. 
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In fact, the SBA has admitted to the district court that it 
will receive its ninety percent (90%) portion of all monies 
collected by Capital in this action.2 
Thus, in direct contradiction to Capital's prior 
representations, the SBA has admitted that it has a substantial 
interest in the action. This interest renders the SBA the real 
party in interest as to its ninety percent share and a necessary 
party to the litigation. 
THE APPELLATE COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE 
SBA CAN AUTHORIZE A CO-OBLIGEE TO ENFORCE 
THEIR JOINT CLAIM CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR 
Following its discussion of the analytical process provided 
by Rule 19, the Court of Appeals recognized that the majority of 
courts have concluded that joint obligees are deemed indispensable 
parties in a suit against an obligor. Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 
767 P.2d at 946.3 Refusing to follow this clear precedent, the 
2However, the SBA compared its status to that of an insurer 
who has been required to pay the insured amount. Even if this 
Court were to accept the SBA's characterization of its status as 
a subrogated insurer rather than a joint obligee, the great weight 
of judicial precedent would require the conclusion that the SBA was 
a necessary party under Rule 19(a). See Compton v. D'Amore, 475 
N.Y.S.2d 463 (A.D. 2 Dept. 1984), see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Collins, 491 N.E.2d 407 (Ohio Mun. 1985). 
3The Uniform Commercial Code has made this general rule a 
statutory requirement in relation to suits to enforce negotiable 
instruments. See Section 70A-3-116 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. 
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Court of Appeals concluded that the SBA, although a joint obligee, 
was not an indispensable party under the facts of the present case 
because it had given Capital written authorization to sue on the 
guaranties. Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d at 946. 
The Appellant Court's conclusion that by authorizing a fellow 
obligee to judicially enforce the obligation owed to them a joint 
obligee can remove itself from the joinder requirements of Rule 19, 
is unsupported by any legal precedent and contradicts this Court's 
decision in Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758 (Utah 1984). 
In Kemp, this Court recognized that courts have universally 
held that an individual partner may not sue in his own name to 
enforce a liability owed to a partnership, and one partner's 
failure to join all partners as plaintiffs is grounds for dismissal 
for lack of necessary parties. Id. 680 P.2d at 759. (citing to 
Rule 19(a)) As this Court explained in Kemp: 
Rules 19(a) and 17(a) both seek to protect the same 
interests: judicial economy and fairness to the parties in 
litigation.... In addition, by requiring joinder of 
necessary parties, Rule 19(a) protects the interests of 
parties who are present by precluding multiple litigation and 
contradictory claims over the same subject matter as the 
original litigation. 
* * * 
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Rule 17(a) serves essentially the same policy by 
requiring an action to be brought by the real party in 
interest. Id. 680 P.2d at 760.4 
As co-obligees, Capital and the SBA have assumed the status 
of de facto partners. As the Court of Appeals noted, the affidavit 
of M. A. Allem, Capital's executive vice president, established 
that the SBA is a participating lender in the loan of Capital to 
Bagel Nosh to the extent of ninety percent (90%) of the outstanding 
unpaid balance. Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d at 944. In 
addition, the SBA is named as a joint lender on the guaranties. 
It must be inferred from these undisputed fact that the SBA has a 
claim against the guarantors for ninety percent (90%) of the 
outstanding balance of the loan.5 
Simply stated, the SBA has a claim under the guaranty 
agreements for recovery of ninety percent (90%) of the obligation, 
and Capital has a claim for ten percent (10%) of the outstanding 
obligation. Together the de facto partnership has a claim for 
repayment of the entire amount. 
4As this Court held in Shaw v. Jeppson, 239 P.2d 745, 748 
(Utah, 1952), the reason the defendant has the right to have a 
cause of action prosecuted by the real party in interest is so that 
the judgment will preclude any action on the same demand by another 
and permit the defendant to assert all defenses or counterclaims 
available against the real owner of the cause." (quoted in Kemp 
v. Murray. 680 P.2d at 760.) 
5In reviewing the granting of a motion for summary judgment 
all facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 
action. See e.g. Themy v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc., 595 P.2d 526 
(Utah 1979). 
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Ignoring the status of the various parties and this Court's 
holding in Kemp, the Court of Appeals held that the SBA can avoid 
the joinder requirement of Rule 19 by authorizing Capital to 
enforce the entire claim in its individual capacity. Thus, 
although Capital is not the real party in interest in relation to 
the SBA's ninety percent (90%) participation, it has received a 
judgment in its name for the entire amount of the outstanding 
obligation.6 
The decision of the Court of Appeals has allowed the SBA and 
Capital to circumvent the express terms and policy of both Rule 
19(a) and Rule 17(a). 
Under Rule 17, every claim must be prosecuted in the name of 
the real party in interest. Rule 17(a) U.R.C.P. The mere 
appointment of an agent by a principal obligee can not make him the 
real party in interest. Goodrich v. Rice, 331 S.E.2d 195, 199 
(N.C. App. 1985). As the North Carolina Supreme Court explained 
in Howard v. Boyce. 146 S.E.2d 828, 831 (N.C. 1966): 
6Rule 17(a) reflects a policy against the use of sham 
plaintiffs. As the Supreme Court of Alaska explained in 
Municipality of Anchorage v. Baucrh Const., 722 P.2d 919, (Alaska 
1986): "Since the insured did not have to sue for the amount for 
which it had already been reimbursed and since the insurer's claim 
was being directly litigated, there was no reason that the insurer 
should not be made a named party." Id. 722 P.2d at 924. 
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[I]t has been consistently held that an agent for another 
could not maintain an action in his name for the benefit of 
his principal. 
The Court of Appeal's decision, which contradicts this Court's 
holding in Kemp and ignores the statutory protections afforded 
Appellant by Rules 19(a) and 17(a), constitutes reversible error. 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S AND APPELLATE COURT'S 
FAILURE TO UNDERTAKE THE ANALYSIS REQUIRED 
BY RULE 19 CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR 
Accepting the arguments advanced by Appellant, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that the district court committed error below in 
failing to appropriately analyze the issue of joinder under Rule 
19. However, in affirming the entry of summary judgment against 
Appellant, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court's 
failure to follow the two-steps analysis outlined in Rule 19 was 
harmless error. Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d at 946. 
In Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217, 222 (Utah 
1983) this Court explained that an error is reversible if there is 
a reasonable likelihood that a more favorable result would have 
been obtained by the complaining party in the absence of the error. 
See alsof Matter of Estate of Kesler. 702 P.2d 86 (Utah 1985). 
In the present case, the Court of Appeals reasoned that if, 
upon a review of the record, there is clear evidence to support the 
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trial court's ultimate conclusion not to join the SBA then any 
procedural error committed by that court would be harmless. The 
Court of Appeals then found that the SBA's written authorization 
to Capital supported the trial court's ultimate conclusion that the 
SBA was not an indispensable party. 
Under the two-step analysis prescribed by Rule 19(a) and 
19(b), the questions presented to the trial court were; (1) whether 
the SBA was a necessary party under Rule 19(a); (2) could the SBA 
be joined in the present action; and (3) if that necessary party 
could not be joined was it so indispensable to the action that in 
equity and good conscience the action should not proceed. See 
Manvaoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 558 (10 Cir. 1977). 
It follows that if a necessary party can be joined in the 
action then the Court need not reach the question of its status as 
indispensable and any decision on that issue would be irrelevant 
to the case. 
Because of the district court's recognized procedural error, 
which included the failure to express findings of fact on the 
issues involved, that court failed to explain the basis for its 
ultimate decision that the SBA was not indispensable.7 To compound 
7The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals explained in Manyaoats v. 
Kleppe, 558 F.2d at 559 that the district court should state the 
facts and reasons upon which it acted in analyzing the issue of 
joinder under Rule 19. The Court of Appeals recognized this 
requirement that the district court make and express its finding 
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the problem, the Court of Appeals failed to undertake the analysis 
required by Rule 19. Rather than analyzing the issue, it simply 
reviewed the record to determine if there was clear evidence to 
support the trial court's conclusory statement that the SBA was not 
indispensable• 
As the Court of Appeals expressly recognized, such conclusory 
statements of an ultimate conclusion, whether voiced by the trial 
court or the Court of Appeals, are of no value and do not comply 
with the requirements of the rule. 
Had either the trial court or the Court of Appeals undertaken 
the analysis required by Rule 19, the SBA would have been joined 
in the action. Therefore, there exists a reasonable likelihood 
that a more favorable result would have been obtained by the 
Appellant in the absence of the error. 
The district court and Appellate Court's failure to properly 
analyze the issue and render findings of fact in support of each 
of the three questions presented by Rule 19 constitutes reversible, 
of fact in ruling on this question. Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 
767 P.2d at 944. As the Tenth Circuit Court explained in Wright 
v. First National Bank of Altus, Oklahoma, 483 F.2d 73, 75 (10th 
Cir. 1973). "It is the function of a trial court to make decisions 
that may be reviewed understandingly by an appellate court." The 
Utah Supreme Court has previously held that, standing alone, a 
district court's failure to make findings is reversible error. 
See Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987) (relied upon by the 
Court of Appeals in the present case); Romrell v. Zions First 
National Bank, N.A., 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980). 
ACM/ms 23 
rather than harmless, error. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court and the Court of Appeals both issued 
conclusory explanations of why the SBA was not an indispensable 
party in the present action. By reaching the issue of the SBA's 
status as an indispensable party both courts were required to 
conclude that it was a necessary party under Rule 19(a). A 
necessary party must be joined in the action if that party is 
subject to service of process and its joinder will not deprive the 
court of jurisdiction. 
Pursuant to federal statute, the SBA is subject to service of 
process and may be joined in the present action without depriving 
the court of jurisdiction. Therefore, as a co-obligee and 
necessary partyf its joinder is required by Rule 19(a). And, any 
order entered by the district court in its absence is null and 
void. 
The Court of Appeals failed to recognize and enforce the 
mandatory joinder provisions of Rule 19(a) in affirming the 
district court's entry of summary judgment against Appellant. That 
failure constitutes reversible error. 
This Court should reverse the Court of Appeal's affirmance of 
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the district court's judgment, hold that judgment void, and remand 
the matter to the district court with a directive that the SBA be 
joined in the action. 
Dated this *^& day of August, 1989. 
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:he collateral including, but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following powera: 
<a> Tn modify or otherwise change any term* of all or any part of the Liabilitiee or the rate of interest thereon (but not to increaae the p 
amount of the note of the Debtor to Lenders to grant any extension or renewal thereof and any other indulgence with respect thereto, 
effect any release, compromise or settlement with respect thereto; 
tb> To enter into any agreement of forbearance with respect to all or any part of the Liabilities, or with respect to eU or any part of the col 
and to change the terms of any such agreement; 
«c> To forbear from calling for additional collateral to secure any of the Liabilities or to secure any obligation comprised in the collateral; 
<d> To consent to the substitution, eirhange. or release of all or any pnrt of the collateral whether or not the collateral if aay. received by 
upon any inch substitution, eachange. or release shall be of ibe same or of a different ehnmcter or value than the collateral surrende 
Lender; 
•*• In the event of the nonpayment *hen due. whether bv acceleration or otherwise, of any of the Liabilities, or in the event of default in the p. 
ance of any obligation comprised in the collateral, to realiae on the collateral or any part thereof, as a whole or in inch parcels or sub 
interest! as Lender aay elect, at any public or pmate tale or sales, for cash or on credit or for future delivery, without demand, adverti 
or notice of the time or plac* of sale or anv adjournment thereof <the Undesigned hereby wntving any such demand, advertisement and iw 
the extent permitted by law*, or hy foreclosure or otherwise, or to forbear from realizing thereon, all as Lender in its uncontrolled discretk 
deem proper, and to purchase all or any part of the collateral for its own account at any such sale or foreclosure, such powers to be excret* 
to the extent permitted by law. 
The obligations of the Undersigned hereunder shall not he released, discharged or » any way affected, nor shell the Undersigned hare aay ri 
recourse against Lender, hy reason A any action Lender may take or omit to take under the foregoing powers. 
In ease the Debtor ahnO fail to pay aO or any part of the Liabilities when due. whether hy acceleration or otherwise, according to the terms « 
note, the Undersigned, immediately upon the written demand of Under, will pay to Under the amount due and unpaid by the Debtor as afore* 
like manner as if such amount constituted the direct and primary obligation of the Undersigned. Under shall not he required, prior to any such demi 
or payment by. the Undersigned, to make any demand upon or pursue or exhaust any of its rights or remedies against the Debtor or others with 
to the payment of any of the Liabilities, or to pursue or exhaust any of its rights or remedies with respect to any part of the collateral The Lndei 
shall have no right of subrogation whatsoever with respect to the Liabilities or the collateral unless and until Under shall have received full payment 
the Liabilities. 
The obligations of the Undersigned hereunder, and the rights of Lender in the collateral shall not he released, discharged or in any way affect« 
»hall the Undersigned have any rights against lea4tr: by reason of the fact that any of the collateral may be in default at the time of acceptance I 
hv Lender or later; nor hv reason of the fact that a valid lien in any of the collateral may not be conveyed to. or created in favor of. Under; nor by 
o< the fact that any of the collateral may be subject to equities or defences or claims in favor of others or may be invalid or defective in any way; 
reason of the fact that any of the Liabilities mav be invalid for anv rr««on whatsoever; nor by reason of the fact that the value of any of the collateral 
financial condition of the Debtor or of anv obligor under or guarantor of an* of the collateral may not have been correctly estimated or may have cl 
or may hereafter change; nor by reason of any deterioration, waste, or loss by fire, theft, ot otherwise of any of the collateral unless such deterk 
waste, or loss be caused by the willful act or willful failure to act of Under. 
The Undersigned agrees to furnish Under, or the holder of the afore«aid note of the Debtor, upon demand, but not more often than semian 
** long as any part of the indebtedness under such note remains unpaid, a financial statement setting forth, in reasonable detail the assets, Hal 
and net worth of the Undersigned. 
The Undersigned acknowledges and understands that if the Small Business Administration (5BAI enters into, has entered into, or wilt enter 
Guaranty Agreement, with Ltn4tr or any other lending institution, guaranteeing a portion of Debtor's Liabilities, the Undersigned agrees that it ii 
coguarantor with SBA and shall have no right of contribution against 5BA. The Undersigned further agrees that all liability hereunder »hal! c< 
notwithstanding payment hy SBA under its Guaranty Agreement to the other lending institution. 
The term "Undersigned** as used in this agreement »hall mean the signer or signers el this agreement, and such signers, if more than one. si 
jointly and severally liable hereunder. The Undersigned further agrees that all liability hereunder shall continue notwithstanding the incapacity. 1 
authority, death, or disability of any one or more of the Undersigned, and that any failure hy Under or its assigns to file or enforce a claim sgait 
estate of any of the Undersigned »bal» not operate to release any other of the Undersigned trots liability hereunder. The failure of any other per 
sign this guaranty shall not release or affect the liability of any signer hereof. 
Theresa L. Seftel ' 
NOTE.—Corporate guarantors must execute guaranty in corporate name, hy duly authorined onker, and Malmust "tfe* affile, and duly att 
partnership guarantors must execute guaranty in firm name, together with signature of a general partner. Formally executed guaranty ia to be del 
at the tiae nf disbursement of loan. 
(LIST ON REVERSE SIDE COLLATERAL SECURING THE GUARANTY) 
S«A FORM tag) (t.7SI RKfr fO*> 70 SO UtC i-71 COITION UN Tit. | X H * U l T I O 
ft Ante 
fa order to induce A ? ^ . . $ D . < L . Q 3 £ i £ A l . . C i t X . . . (hereinafter tailed "Lender") to make a loan or loans, or renewal or extension thereof 
(SBA or other Lending Institution) 
. l a * f i ^ ! i ^ t . f . ^ ^ 5 . 1 1 ^ . H ? . . < J « ? . - . > i M . c.H«. ,he -Deb. . , " . , the L d , « , 
hereby unconditionally guarantees to Lender, its successors and assigns, tbe due and punctual pavment when due. whether by acceleration or othei 
in accordance with the terms thereof, of the principal of and interest on and all other sums payable, or stated to be payable, wtthxteipccrfo the note o 
Debtor, made by the Debtor to Lender, dated - l Z - r 2 ^ . 7 9 n the principal amount of $3QQ,.OQOjOO»ith interest at the rate of . - ^ i f i f . per 
per annum. Such note, and tbe interest thereon and all other sums payable with respect thereto are hereinafter collectively calfal/Xiabilmes ** As sec 
for the performance of this guaranty the Indersigncd berebv mortgages, pledges, assigns, transfers and delivers to Lender certain collateral tif any). 1 
in the schedule on the reverse side hereof The term 'collateral" as used herein shall mean any funds, guaranties, agreements or other property or ngh 
interests of any nature whatsoever, or the proceeds thereof which may have been, are, or hereafter may be. mortgaged, pledged, assigned, transferre 
delivered directly or indirectly by or on behalf of the Debtor or the Lndersigned or any other part* to Lender or to the holder of the aforesaid note ol 
Debtor, or which may have been, are, or hereafter mav be held by any party at trustee or otherwise, as security, whether immediate or underlying, lo 
performeftee of this guaranty or the payment of the Liabilities or aa> of them or any security therefor 
Tbe Undersigned waives any notice of the incurring bv the Debtor at anv time of anv of the Liabilities, and waives anv and all presentment, dem 
protest or notice of dishonor, nonpayment, or other default with respect to anv of the Liabilities and anv obligation of any party at any time compi 
m the collateral. Tbe Undersigned hereby grants to Lender full power, in its uncontrolled discretion and without notice to the undersigned, but tui 
to tbe provissoe* af any agreement between the Debtor or anv other party and Lender at the time tn force, to deal in any manner with the Liabilities 
the collateral, including, but without limiting the generality of tbe foregoing, the following power* 
<e) To modify or otherwise change any terms of all or ant part of the Liabilities or the rate of in'erest thereon (but not to increase tbe prim 
amount of the note of the Debtor to Lender), to grant any estension or renewal thereof and an> other indulgence with respect thereto, ant 
elect any release, compromise or settlement with re*peel thereto; 
<b) To enter into anv agreement of forbearance with respect to all or any part of the Liabilities or with respect to all or any part of tbe collate 
and to change the terms of any such agreement; 
<c> To forbear from calling for additional collateral to secare any of the Liabilities or to secure anv obligation comprised tn tbe collateral, 
<d» To consent to the substitution, eichange. or release of all or any part of the collateral whether or not the collateral, if any. received by Lea 
i any such substitution exchange, or relrase shall be of the same or of a different character or value than the collateral surrendered 
<e* In tbe event of the nonpayment when due. whether bv accelr ration or otherwise, of anv of the Liabilities or in the event of default in the perfoi 
ance of any obligation comprised la the collateral, to realise on tbe collateral or an> part thereof as a whole or tn «ucb parcels or subdretd 
interests as Lender may elect, at aay public or pn>ate sale or sales, for cash or on credit or for future delivery without demand, advertises* 
or notice of the time or place of sale or any adjournment thereof < the Undersigned herebv waiving any such demand, advertisement and notice 
tbe extent permitted by law), or by foreclosure or otherwise, or to forbear from realizing thereon all as Lender m its uncontrolled discretion e 
deem proper, aad to purchase all or any part of the collateral for its own account at any such sale or foreclosure such powers to be exercised «i 
to tbe extent permitted by law 
The obligations of the Undersigned hereunder shall not be released, discharged or ta any way affected, nor shall the Undersigned have any rights 
recourse agaiast Lender, by reason of any action Lender may take or omit to take under the foregoing powers. 
fa ease tbe Debtor shaQ fafl ta pay all or any part of the Liabilities when due. whether bv acceleration or otherwise, according to the terms of « 
note, the Undersigned, immediately upon the written demand of Lender, will pay to Lender the amount due and unpaid by tbe Debtor as sforesaid. 
like manner as if such amount constituted the direct and pnmarv obligation of the Lndersigned Lender shall not be required prior to any such demand c 
or payment by, the Undersigned, to make aay demand epon or pursue or exhaust anv of its neht« or remedies against the Debtor or others with respe 
to the payment of aay of tbe Liabilities, or to pursue ot exhaust anv of its rights or remedies with respect to anv part of the collateral. Tbe Undersign* 
shall have no ngbt of subrogation whatsoever with respect to the Liabilities or the collateral unless and until Lender shall have received full payment of * 
tbe Liabilities. 
Tbe obligations of tbe Undersigned hereunder, tnd the rights of Lender in the collateral. «haU not be released, divharced or in any way affected IH 
shall the Undersigned have any rights against Lender bv reason of the fact that anv of tbe collateral mav be tn default at the time of acceptance them 
bv lender or later; nor by reason of the fact that a valid hen in anv of the collateral mav not be cometed to, or created in favor of. Lender, nor by reasc 
of tbe fact that any of tbe collateral may be subject to equities or defenses or claims tn favor of <»ther» or mav be invalid or defective in any way; nor h 
reason of tbe fact that any of the Liabilities mav he invalid for »n% reason whatsoever nor bv reason of the fact that the value of anv of the collateral or ih 
financial condition of the Debtor or of anv obligor under or guarantor of anv of the collateral mav not have been correct I v estimated or may have change 
or may hereafter change; nor by reason of any deterioration, waste, or loss by fire theft, or otherwise of any of the collateral unies« such detenoratioi 
waste, or loss be caused by the willful act or willful failure to act of Lender. 
The Undersigned agrees to furnish Lender, or the bolder of the aforesaid note of the Drbtor upon demand, but not more often than semiannual! 
so long as any part of the indebtedness under such note remains unpaid, a financial statement setting forth, in reasonable detail the assets, liabilitie 
and net worth of tbe Undersigned. 
The Undersigned acknowledges and understands that if the *mall Business Administration < QB *.» enter* into has entered into, or will enter mto. 
Guaranty Agreement with Lender or aay other lending institution guaranteeing a portion of Debtor's Liabilities, the lndersigned agrees that it is not 
c»guaraator with 5*BA and shall have no right of contribution against *»BA. The lndersigned further agree* that all liability hereunder shall eontmn 
notwithstanding payment by SBA under its Cuarant) %grecment to tbe other lending institution. 
The term "Undersigned" as used in this agreement shall mean the signer or signers of this agreement, and such signers, it more than one, shall bi 
join'l) and severally liable hereunder The Undersigned further agrees that all liability hereunder shall continue notwithstanding the incapacity laek » 
authority, death, or disability of any one or more of tbe Undersigned, and that anv failure bv Lender or its assigns to file or enforce a claim against tb( 
estate of any of the Undersigned shall not operate to release any other of tbe Lndersigned from liability hereunder The fatluaAf anv otbgr perwpkU 
sign this guaranty shall not release or affect tbe liability of any signer hereof. 
NOTE.—Corporate guarantors most execute guaranty in corporate name, by duly authorised officer, and seal must be affixed and duly attested: 
partaersbip guarantors must execute guaranty In firm name, together with signature of a general partner. Formally executed guaranty is ta be delivered 
at tbe tiaae of disbursement of loan. 
(LIST ON REVERSE SIDE COLLATERAL SECURING THE GU4RANTY) 
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EXHIBIT 7 
March 30. 19*3 
Capital City Bank, (the Bank), agrees to modify the terms of the loan agree-
ment dated December 24, 1979, between the Bank aud Bagel Nosh Intermountain Ltd., 
Inc., (the Borrower), under the following conditions: 
1. The Borrower agrees to bring all accrued Interest current on March 
30, 1983. Accrued interest on March 30, 1983, will be $15,937.61. 
If the Borrower makes the payment of $5,557.50 on March 25, 1983, as 
specified in the loan agreement now in effect, all of which will be 
applied to interest, then the amount of accrued interest due will be 
$10,380.11. 
2. The Borrower agrees to reduce the principal amount of the loan by 
$2,746.09, leaving a principal balance of $296,000.00. 
3. The Borrower agrees to provide signed monthly operating statements 
and balance sheets to the Bank until all indebtedness to the Bank is 
paid in full. The Borrower will provide the statements within 30 
days of the end of each month. 
4. The Borrower agrees to provide evidence of continuous insurance cover-
age on all collateral assigned to the Bank to secure the loan until 
the loan is paid in full. If insurance on any of the collateral lapses 
or is cancelled, then the loan may be accelerated. 
5. Sidney Seftel and Michael Landes personally guarantee the Bank's loan 
to the Borrower. Each is personally liable for the entire indebtedness 
to the Bank. Each agrees to provide the Bank by February 28th of each 
year a current personal financial statement as specified in the loan 
agreement dated December 24, 1*79. 
6. Any item in the loan agreement dated December 24, 1979, that is not 
specifically modified by this loan restructure agreement remains in 
full force. 
7. The Bank agrees to lower the Borrowerfs monthly payment from $5,557.50 
per month to $4,000.00 per month for a period of one year as long as 
interest is paid in full each month and principal is reduced by a 
minimum of $500.00. If the payment does not cover interest in full 
and a minimum principal reduction of $500.00 each month, then the 
Borrower will increase the payment at least by the amount of interest 
not covered and by a minimum of $500.00 to reduce principal. The 
Borrower understands that if the rate in effect on March 30, 1983, 
were to remain in effect until December 24, 1987, and that if the 
payment of $4,000.00 were to be made each month, then the principal 
amount due and payable on December 24, 1987, would be approximately 
$230,000.00. 
8. The Bank agrees to reduce the increment over the prime rate from 2.75 
percent to 2.25 percent adjusted quarterly. The prime rate will be 
that then in effect at the Bank on January 1, April 1, July 1, and 
October 1, of each year until December 24, 1987. 0001.^*7 
Dated c h l s 30th day of March, 1983. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK BAGEL NOSH INTERMOUNTAIN LTD., INC. 
By, ^^if/'df^ %MPto: ^4^* . fr '£/"' 
C / 
SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION FIRST VARIABLE RATE FUND 
Byt Byj 
000 
<A JL 
CO 
I 
D 
h 
f^S^SS^(^?80)<,ttI, 
[| Steven T. Waterman (4164) 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-3300 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant, Capital City Bank 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL, 
and MICHAEL LANDES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL, 
MICHAEL LANDES, UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, CROSSROADS PLAZA 
ASSOCIATES, a Utah joint venture and 
general partnership, YOUNG ELECTRIC 
SIGN COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
and OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING 
CENTER, LTD., a Utah limited 
partnership, 
Counterclaim Defendant. 
Civil No. C86-1810 
(Judge Hanson) 
AFFIDAVIT OF M.A. ALLEM 
000185 
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M.A. Allem, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am the Executive Vice President of Capital City Bank (hereinafter 
"Capital City"), the Defendant and Counterclaimant in the above-captioned proceeding, 
and am authorized by Capital City to execute this affidavit. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein. 
3. As Executive Vice President of Capital City, I am responsible for 
supervising the maintenance of the books and records (including both accounting records 
and loan files with correspondence) of that institution (hereinafter "Books and Records") 
and am the custodian of the Books and Records. 
4. The Books and Records are maintained by several employees of Capital 
City on a daily basis, are audited by a firm of certified public accountants, and are 
examined by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation which insures the deposits 
of Capital City. 
5. Entries in the Books and Records are made at or near the occurrence 
of each entry or event. 
6. Each entry is made and recorded by an employee of Capital City having 
knowledge of the facts to be entered and which employee has a duty to record as 
part of her or his employment with Capital City. 
7. Each entry made in the Books and Records is made in the regular course 
of the business activity of Capital City. 
8. Each entry is recorded in the ordinary course of the business activity 
of Capital City. 
i0( 
m^gg^^mamS^Ttm^Womm^mnA Records relative to tne loan wmcn 
is the subject of the above-captioned proceeding. 
10. The loan of Capital City to Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd. (hereinafter 
tfBagel Nosh"), was made purusant to Part 101 of the Rules and Regulations of the 
Small Business Administration, an agency of the United States of America (hereinafter 
"SBA"). 
11. SBA is a participating lender in the loan of Capital City to Bagel Nosh 
to the extent of ninety percent (90%) of the outstanding unpaid balance. 
12. On March 30, 1983, the loan of Capital City to Bagel Nosh was in default 
for failure of Bagel Nosh (and Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, and Michael S. Landes, 
plaintiffs herein and personal guarantors of the obligation of Bagel Nosh) to make 
the payments required under the terms of the note (and absolute, unconditional, 
personal guaranties among other reasons. 
13. Pursuant to a Loan Restructure Agreement (Exhibit 6 to the Answer 
and Counterclaim of Capital City) executed on or about March 30, 1983, the defaults 
of Bagel Nosh and its personal guarantors were cured. 
14. On November 29, 1984, Bagel Nosh filed a voluntary petition for relief 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
15. During the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding, from approximately 
Novmeber 29, 1984, through December 27, 1985, reduced monthly payments on the 
obligation of Bagel Nosh to Capital City were made by Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, 
and Michael S. Landes as guarantors through their attorneys. 
16. Since at least January 25, 1986, the obligations of Bagel Nosh under 
the note and the obligations of Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, and Michael S. Landes 
under their personal guaranties have been in default for failure to make payments 
as provided in those instruments or as modified. 
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h*ve been made on the note of 
of Capital City since December 27,1985. 
18. The amount due to Capital City from Bagel Nosh, Sidney Seftel, Theresa 
Seftel, and Michael S. Landes pursuant to the note and absolute, unconditional, personal 
guaranties as of March 31, 1986, is $265,848.07 plus accruing interest at the rate 
of 11.75 percent per annum plus accruing costs and attorneys1 fees. 
19. No comments or complaints either formal or informal have been made 
by Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, or Michael S. Landes to Capital City, or its employees 
or agents, relative to the Loan Restructure Agreement of March 30, 1983, until the 
complaint was filed in the above-captioned action. 
20. At no time prior to the complaint, filed in the above-captioned 
proceeding, have Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, or Michael S. Landes made written 
representations or notice to Capital City of the sale or other disposition of the 
equipment of Bagel Nosh in which Capital City has an interest. 
21. According to the Books and Records, no representations have been 
made by Capital City, its agents or employees, to Crossroads Plaza Associates or 
its agents or employees, that Capital City did not have or does not have an interest 
in the personal property or equipment of Bagel Nosh. 
DATED this day of July, 1986. 
7^fsZ?&> 
M.A. Allem 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this j j j ^ d a y of July, 1986. 
Notary Public, residing at 
4r»t4 U^e, County, Utah 
My commission expires: 
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r,Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)363-3300 
Attorneys for Defendant, Capital City Bank 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL, 
and MICHAEL LANDES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL, 
MICHAEL LANDES, UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, CROSSROADS PLAZA 
ASSOCIATES, a Utah joint venture and 
general partnership, YOUNG ELECTRIC 
SIGN COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
and OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING 
CENTER, LTD., a Utah limited 
partnership, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
Civil No. C86-1810 
(Judge Hanson) 
CAPITAL CITY BANK'S 
REPLY MEMORANDUM OF 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
IN SUPPORT OF ITS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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"Capftal City% by and through its counsel, 
files this memorandum in reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and pursuant to leave of 
this Court granted by the Honorable Scott Daniels pursuant to an Order dated October 
2, 1986, which also continued the hearing in this matter to October 27, 1986, at 2:30 
p.m. Plaintiffs (Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, and Michael Landes) may be referred 
to herein collectively as "Guarantors." 
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Capital City is the holder of all loan instruments relating to the Bagel 
Nosh loan including the Note executed by Bagel Nosh in favor of Capital City on 
December 24, 1979 (Exhibit 1 to Capital Cityfs Memorandum), and the guaranty 
agreements of even date executed by each of the Guarantors. [Supplemental Affidavit 
of M.A. Allem previously filed with this Court and a copy of which is attached hereto 
as Exhibit 17] 
2. The Guarantors have admitted that they are personally liable on the 
Note in favor of Capital City and that the guaranties have continuing effectiveness 
in the "Disclosure Statement by Proponents of the Reorganization Plan" dated October 
8, 1985, which includes the "Plan of Reorganization by Proponents" dated October 
8, 1985, which they have filed in the Bagel Nosh bankruptcy proceeding and certified 
copies of which are attached hereto as Exhibit 18. 
ARGUMENT 
The Guarantors are the only parties responding in writing to Capital City's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. They assert that genuine issues of material fact 
exist precluding the availability of summary judgment. The GuarantorsT memorandum 
asserts three points comprising four issues which are: (1) factual issues exist relative 
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f illTiimy' Cl^ytf i^M^ tmm mtttm <**Utmvh <D ttodtfteatioii of ttm Mote Asctmrged tba Guarantors; (3) Capital City failed to join an indispensable party; and (4) Capital 
- Cityfs recovery should be limited to Capital Cityfs participation in the Note. Each 
of the issues is addressed herein. 
POINT I 
THE GUARANTORS ADMIT THE CONTINUING 
VITALITY OF THEIR GUARANTIES 
The Guarantors have alleged that actions of Capital City on or about October 
31, 1981, and in February 1985, discharged their liabilities under the guaranties. 
However, the legal documents filed by the Guarantors in the Bagel Nosh bankruptcy 
proceeding in referring to payment of Capital City explicity state that Capital City 
will be "retaining the personal guarantors on the loan." See, Disclosure Statement 
by Proponents of the Reorganization Plan, p. 26 (attached as Exhibit 18). That 
document is dated October 8, 1985, and signed by counsel for the Guarantors. Thus, 
the liability has been expressly admitted or there has been an express waiver or consent 
to any modifications in addition to all other arguments previously advanced by Capital 
City. 
POINT II 
NO GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT EXISTS 
The Guarantors concede the applicability of federal law to this action. In 
order to ascertain if a genuine issue of material fact exists the law of the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals must be applied. 
To support their position, the Guarantors rely primarily upon dictum in United 
States v. Abbruzzese, 553 F.Supp. 11, 13 (E.D.Mich.1982) interpreting the "deterioration 
clause" of the Form 148 guaranty. That Court states its opinion that its interpretation 
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Tractor ft: Implement Co* v. Securities Acceptance Corp., 243 F.2d 196 
(10th Cir. 1957) upon which case the Guarantors also rely. However, the Joe Heaston 
Tractor case did not deal with a Form 148 guaranty. Nor have the Guarantors cited 
any authority where any court has ruled against the lender under a Form 148 guaranty. 
Furthermore, after the 1982 Abbruzzese opinion, the "deterioration clause," 
now relied upon by the Guarantors, has been interpreted by the Tenth Circuit earlier 
this year in United States v. New Mexico Landscaping, Inc., 785 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 
1986). The Tenth Circuit stated? 
Therefore, in order to establish a 'willful act or willful failure to act,' 
by the [lender] under the guaranty agreement, a guarantor must allege 
more than 'gross neglect of a known duty.? A guarantor seeking to 
establish Willfulness1 under this guaranty agreement must allege fa 
purpose by the [lender] to diminish the value of the security in order 
to intentionally injure the [guarantors]/ 785 F.2d at 848 (citation omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
The Tenth Circuits language is dispositive of this case. 
No allegation of the complaint alleges any purpose by Capital City "to diminish 
the value of the security in order to intentionally injure" the Guarantors. Indeed, 
any allegation of that nature is highly improbable since the alleged loss arises from 
execution on a default judgment against a corporation (in which the Guarantors are 
the principals) which judgment arose from a suit in which the Guarantors were 
co-defendants and who chose to answer the complaint on their own behalves but 
permitted a default judgment to be entered against their corporation. Having failed 
to set forth any allegations and provide any evidence of the "willfulness" requirement, 
summary judgment against the Guarantors is appropriate. Accordingly, the Guarantor's 
causes of action should be dismissed with prejudice. 
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THE GUARANTORS EXPRESSLY CONSENTED TO 
MODIFICATION OF THE NOTE 
The Guarantors persist in their assertion that material modifications in the 
Note discharged their obligations although their argument is in their memorandum 
under the heading relative to willful loss of the collateral. At page nine (9) of their 
memorandum, the Guarantors allege material alterations were made to the Note, 
including extension of the term, without the consent of the Guarantors. However, 
there was JtfO extension of the terms of the loan. The alterations were a reduction 
of both the interest rate and the monthly payment. Further, on page ten (10) of their 
memorandum, the Guarantors suggest in a non-sensical phrase that Capital City has 
conceded some point and that there is no allegation that the Guarantors, in their 
individual capacities, consented to any alterations. 
To be clear, Capital City has not conceded anything. Further, Capital City 
reiterates its position stated in Point II at page fourteen (14) of its memorandum 
in support of its motion for summary judgment and emphatically articulates that 
the Guarantors, in their individual capacities, expressly consented in the guaranty 
agreements to any and all modifications to the Note thereby waiving any and all rights 
which they might have been able to assert* 
Capital City also has provided additional information and argument which 
(as the Guarantors have recognized) supports a position that notwithstanding the 
express waiver there has been an implicit consent to the modifications or waiver 
of their rights. See also Point I, supra. 
Two of the cases cited by the Guarantors with reference to the alterations 
are inapposite. Sauder v. Dittmar, 118 F.2d 524 (10th Cir. 1941) is an old Tenth Circuit 
opinion which does not even deal with guaranties. Tomlin v. Ceres, 507 F.2d 642 
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Of ihm principal note will discharge 
Dot does not address a specific waiver by the guarantor which is the issue 
in this case. 
The other two cases relied upon the Guarantors actually support the position 
of Capital City. In Depositors Trust Co. v. Hudson General Corp., 485 F.Supp. 1355 
(E.D.N.Y. 1980), the guaranty specifically required the lender to give notice to the 
guarantor of any modification and to obtain his consent thereto. The lender * failed 
to give notice or obtain the guarantors consent. Thus, the guarantor was discharged 
of his liability. Notice is specifically and expressly waived in the guaranty agreements 
executed by the Guarantors and which are at issue before this Court. 
Finally, F.D.I.C. v. Manion, 712 F.2d 295 (7th Cir. 1983), involved a guaranty 
in which the guarantor expressly consented to modifications of the principal note 
but also provided a means for the guarantor to revoke his continuing guaranty. After 
revocation of the guaranty, the lender extended the Note and after default sought 
to recover from the guarantor. The Courts opinion acknowledges that a consent 
in the guaranty waives the guarantor's right to object to a modification or alteration. 
In that particular case the alteration occurred after revocation, effectively discharging 
the guarantor since the Court interpreted the waiver to apply only to extension or 
modification of the Note prior to revocation of the guaranty. Implicit in the Seventh 
Circuit's reasoning is if the extension had occurred prior to revocation of the guaranty, 
the guarantor would have remained liable since the guaranty agreement waived the 
rights of the guarantor. 
In this case, the Guarantors have explicitly consented to the modifications. 
The guaranties state that the Guarantors grant: 
[T]o Lender full power, in its uncontrolled discretion and without notice 
. . . to deal in any manner with the liabilities and the collateral, including, 
but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following powers: 
6
 ootf^'6 
There is no provision in the guaranties for revocation as in the Manion case relied 
upon by the Guarantors. If the Manion court had been faced with the facts of this 
case, it is apparent that the guarantors would not have been discharged since the 
guaranty agreements provide an explicit consent to the modification of the Note 
without notice, 
POINT IV 
SBA IS NOT AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY 
The Guarantors last two arguments are that the SBA is an indispensable party 
having a ninety percent (90%) interest in the Note and guaranties, and, therefore, 
Capital City's recovery should be limited to ten percent (10%) of the outstanding 
balance. Thoss arguments are meritless. 
The general law concerning a party in interest is not available in the context 
of negotiable instruments nor is the relationship between SBA and Capital City a 
partnership as the Guarantors assert. The holder of a negotiable instrument has the 
right to sue on the note regardless of actual ownership. See, Utah Code Ann. 
§70A-3-301 (1980). The obligor under the instrument is protected when the holder 
of the instrument is paid since payment to the holder discharges the obligation. See, 
Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-603 (1980). In this case, Capital City is the holder of the 
legal instruments, is entitled to collect the Note through suit or otherwise, and is 
entitled to recovery thereon. 
Furthermore, a participant to a loan is not an indispensable party since its 
claims are only against the note holder (lead lender) as to its pro rata portion of the 
proceeds and does not have a direct claim against the obligor. Hibernia National 
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?a participation. SBA has agreed to participate in the loan to the extent of ninety 
percent (90%) of the outstanding debt when certain conditions are satisfied. The 
loan was fully funded by Capital City, and SBA has not yet purchased any portion 
of the debt. Consequently, the interest of SBA is only as a potential participant, 
and at this point, SBA is not entitled to any proceeds to be recovered. 
All parties necessary to a complete resolution of the issues before this Court 
have been joined. Capital City, as the holder of the instruments, is entitled to summary 
judgment for the full amount of the outstanding obligation plus applicable costs 
including attorneys1 fees incurred. 
CONCLUSION 
Capital City has met its burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material 
fact exists under the applicable law. Accordingly, this case is ripe for summary 
judgment which should be entered in favor of Capital City and against each of the 
Counterclaim Defendants including Plaintiffs. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3 day of October, 1986. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
^.—a^ 
JSfeven T. Waterman 
Attorneys for Capital City Bank 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the - > ~ day of October, 1986, I served the foregoing 
Capital City Bank's Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment upon the following, by depositing copies thereof in 
the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as shown below: 
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ACkSON A WILKINSON 
Arrow Press Square, Suite 200 
165 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Kent W. Larsen 
Thomas B. Green 
LARSEN, KIMBALL, PARR & CROCKETT 
185 South State, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Neil B. Smith 
P.O. Box 25728 
336 South 400 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84125 
Utah State Tax Commission 
Mary Beth Walls, Assistant Attorney General 
23 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Douglas Mortenson 
MATHESON, JEPPSON & MORTENSON 
658 East 180 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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Maln3»iite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)363-3300 
Attorneys for Defendant, Capital City Bank 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL, 
and MICHAEL LANDES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL, 
MICHAEL LANDES, UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, CROSSROADS PLAZA 
ASSOCIATES, a Utah joint venture and 
general partnership, YOUNG ELECTRIC 
SIGN COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
and OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING 
CENTER, LTD., a Utah limited 
partnership, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
Civil No. C86-1810 
(Judge Hansen) 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
AFFIDAVIT OF M.A. ALLEM 
i= <M 
2 O 
* 0 H 
5 9
 2? 
r
 »" O 
- 2 w 
•<li 
k J 
-* < 
f COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
M.A. Allem, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am the Executive Vice President of Capital City Bank (hereinafter 
"Capital City") the Defendant and Counterclaimant in the above-captioned proceeding 
and am authorized by Capital City to execute this affidavit. 
2. This affidavit supplements the affidavit filed in this action and executed 
by myself on the 17th day of July, 1986. 
3. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein. 
4* Attached hereto is a true and correct copy of the agreement executed 
between Capital City and the Small Business Administration of the United States 
of America (hereinafter "SBA") entitled "Loan Guaranty Agreement (Deferred 
Participation)" commonly known as SBA Form 750 executed on September 20, 1978, 
by Capital City and SBA (hereinafter "SBA Participation Guaranty"). 
5. Pursuant to paragraph 6 of the SBA Participation Guaranty, Capital 
City is the holder of all loan instruments, which in this case includes the note executed 
by Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd., on December 24, 1979, which is Exhibit 1 to the 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities filed by Capital City and the Guaranty 
Agreements trf even date executed by Sidney-Seftel and Theresa L. Seftel and Michael 
S. Landes attached as Exhibits 4 and 6 respectively to Capital City!s Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities, and until those instruments are transferred to SBA, Capital 
City is entitled to sue upon the loan instruments including acceleration of the maturity 
of the note and guaranties provided Capital City has obtained the written consent 
of SBA. 
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rf. Capital City is the legal holder of the note and guaranties involved 
in this action, and Capital City has not transferred the note or guaranties to SBA 
and has been authorized in writing by SBA to sue upon the note and guaranties and 
accelerate the maturity thereof. 
DATED this ^JzT^ay o f September, 1986. 
M.A. Allem 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this { j f ^ d a y of September, 1986. 
Notary Public residing at 
\(\UJ- /jJr i . County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
ooo-<[& 
Capital City Bank . 2200 So. State St. , Salt lake City, Utah PAU5 
(Lender's name and full address) 
•ad Small Business Administration {SBA;, an agencv ot the United States Government. 
THFREAS. tne parties intend tor Lender to mate and SBA to guarantee loans to small Business concerns 
pursuant to the Small Business Act, as amended, and Title V of ene Small Business Investment Ac;, as amendec 
NOI. THEREFORE, tne names agree as follows: 
1. Application lor Gworonty. Tnt« agreement shall cover only loans duly approved hereafter tor guararm bv 
Lenoer and SBA aubiect to SBA's Rules and Regulations as promulgated trom time to time. Any loan approved bv 
Lenoer contingent upon SBA's gus*ant% under tms -»>ieement shall be referred to SBA ror authorization upon trie 
separate application* oi Lender and tne loan applicant. 
2. Appro vol of Guaranty. S B \ shall either aprrcve in a formal loan authorization or decline the guaranty by 
aritten notice re the Lender. Pttot to full disoursemenr ot the loan, soy change in the terms or conditions stated 10 
the loan authorization shall be subiect to prior written agreement between SBA and Lender. 
3. Closmg or6 Disbursement of Loons. Lena** «hsll close and disburse each loan in accordance with the terms 
and condition* of the approved ."*r authorization ler.4er shall cause to be executed a ooce* and all additional 
instruments am; 'alee «ucr othe* >"jon* mh»rr sha! , wons.srent with prudent closing practices, be requited m order 
fully to protect o* preserve the interests of Lender and SBA in the loan, Immediately after the first disbursement of 
each loan, Lender shall furnish SBA with a copy oi the esecuted note, sett.ement sheet* sad compensation agreement* 
and guaranty fee mentioned in pa. agrapfc * berenr Turned arelv following any subsequent disbursements, Lender shall 
furnish SBA with an eiecuied «ett',eiien: *heet.**BA shall be entitled at sn% time, afte* written notice to examine 
and obtain coc«es of all notes, secutiry agreements, nstriments of hypothecation, al1 other agreements snd documents 
'h»rem collectively called "Loan Instruments**', *nd »he lose :?payment records held by Lender which relste to loans 
trait pursuant to this agreement. 
4. ftanor* •M*o*ua. tender shal! cAmp'.e • and \»:«ard tc SB*, a written, ?.«rtet't s*.»*jft Tort.* This rejort 
\a l l be *'u- -» *h n 2 r 24 \* «*te* the end of the repv*f*ir»g period specified ir the report. £BA f a l l *>o: -e oH AT* ted 
re po;c*5^f *•• _ ruted ;e.-cen!*ge of the ouistand'ng ra'ance of :he !oao 11 SBA de:*'<ttnf» -hat Lender's rai *u:e 
:o p e e d» • -•*_ . •*•» sc?.:a*e s#a»u* in'orrystion caused sny svhs'antla! harm to the C l e m e n t . 
5. % . v •; r ? s * w«r ••-a!' : ay V?M a onetime guaranty fee amounting to one jerceo* of the • •> •! *- >at 
5 . # ' » r re; : . •**. I*V t \:?'t:y fee t\*\% Ve paid within 90 days of 'he date of ihe loaf. 4^pr-ra' s:« ed - ti *-ao 
. W* j ,* '< •*- «. t,.
 u >f j 8 j ^ .v if n , ,*rt , e ; ^ ^ g A WJJJ fcn£ .jje ^ e n<; e . t «-;-:er. r.~:.ct »iicb *ill 
-•*tf l i v - ^ -.\ - V 5 **ar w:P be cer~, r.ated if SBA does not rece ve the fee aithin the » mt s;fcc • ei in 
'rt i M r • "" • t, * • 'y. *n" this !~ar *».a> he rei-stated by SBA at •»* s<*le discretion purs-an: tc i r t - ; ; f-b" 
' -h*i by *B* "* Tr.e fWera! Register. There wiT be r.r -ebate of ••;» gja'antj <ee a: sn> t rr.c -r *ss he !,:*-•* '3S 
.-»• "*3e A*ij i . « i o« • f h e g a * u i . . . i ' *f#">i .«- , f»t* s . f . r n e * •». frc g-*rer *\»h .atjce'lj: jt ^ *we 
foar jswthc ^a*:on. ^^^•pt»n<e of th*
 §w ^*'»t> fee by s ? / »ha!! not c -*:.*- e u, . « . , t e . -•. SB* o# an. **g* ft -cs 
o- Jcher rr.4 ea-nnce ••. *he ;art of he ! e-;»: "H-- gja ^.itee ree -r-ai' Vf ^i i b> •-.eLen*e* »nc *o» b»\ tht bj."-'*s't. 
6 AdmJn»»f*ot on o' L ** ?na. L- • Je* v -,T h '.'•»'- r i c ' « - . -r«, .-£ * il *s.e v» all ;a \ -cn.§ o' p'inc rai 
;n^ . n t f ? * ' . -r, • • he ru^e tr CR*.. H^\e" of *w.e 'w»te 'Lender or *»?•. «fci a-* * ^.. p- w»"*r c .T 
jent of *he " her * L» »f.s»n' • i - ; . '-••-r- »' j ' * r j * or » v* - " . ' * * ' . - - ' * *• - , T "_V« *»'** a!** 
'T'C* ;rle* ^ j * :« n.i * • *i •-, ,~-e* e« r pw?rc •-* ^n* J» M m ' r*** n . . - * > • .c — «* J •'.(« •>* . .-.*' * » 
-rei'e. .net >n the ' e b -*•.- .<• ^v>•.fr»• tc - se^ of ; !'.«:t a. *a r* a » »• *.t * «• a - -„bf* 
J*---rr».7*J b; *Se s 1> o. v* - , ' e , * - .« - ^;; 'v^n ?** pev *n: of the o»:? •««! » •• nr, :' a' ;'?•»:• *ne 
- -u. it> :. .*; n~ s 'J w- ,- *ry * j? '-s* »"»»n., or (e* *a*%e *n% *'» T
 t<* >• ,r \ -»• j * - " ^ t 
*"' to: D* «. • ubj *c t >r •• '*£ j^» of arj * .r *->* '»r.-;nt. Al' , . v. re
 - k ,on< shall oe tr.e -«. - « . D . ' '% .^ ^e 
-**£-. *»h k-«r N " « i . , »! i - : J r' •
 tr > -K* "g - aj !v y *d v j pr jient '.*r»de'«. £**»* ' s " j , . > .r p. , r *t 
' -*• :* r ;*A'- f t»«h r<*a . . • - * ' • • .^-# <»g».!ar.czs d* C.F.R., Tart 11}* «-sl! v>e <-c ec: -. *:r >o 
* *;l> - , 5.5a.. 
^ **\a* >E*» putchase rhe g-a i>-»%€*- :*::?t i».e of .He out* 
.^: - " -je« u'lcured for more than 60 dsys (or less , if SBA 
i"-,:V. J" j^-kc.ra! or interest or . ^ note. Bv making written de* 
a ' .an, T enier sha'I be oeemed thereon to certify tnst the loan has 
v
 •• uA:c-D'-nr and that this agreement remainr in full force snd 
.. *-zti?- of I e ,Je»*« demand, together with a certified transcript 
• !-.-• . - ? J t s w c o u : *ec>uxse, SBA will pav to Lender the guar* 
•* ."^ l-:e:;s: %: the note rate, after adjustment for othe* ths'ges, 
Jke o1 r.i*;es:0 e% Jercng the percentage of loan retsined bv the 
i . ' i r - . s t :a .on of the lean after SBA purcftases :r*e g.a'*nteed 
-e of p,'r^i«« conformed cop.es of aav ot the Loan lnst'umer.ts not 
: iT\\t A v.e 2»t* evtvl*n;mg 5BA*» petceatige of the loan. Pv*:-
«. ".g f tit L^natr's n-cl $tnctt *u sconduct, or vids' ioo ot sny 
I . Fees o» Co .T> ts ort. ! e^Jet ^ba!! oot ,-cqu.re certificates of deposit or compensating balances snd shall not 
directl) or i:«„"'e».t?, ha ^e o: recc.ve any benus, fee, ooiirtssion or other pa>ment or benefir in connection with 
making or <*'V>c -g mv \ a n , except te.mbursenuent for chsrges or eipenses mcuired or compensation for actual 
service* rendered. 
9. Shoring of Repair •*? Proe»sds ond Colfstarol. Lender shall not acquire any prefe/entia! security, surety or 
Irsursnce to protect .ts unguaranteed interest in a loan. All repayments, security or guaranty of any nature, including 
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It* SBA Pvecfcose Prlvilofw* Notwithstanding am provision ot any agreement between SBA and Lender, SBA has 
the absolute right a: any time tc purchase its guaranteed percentage ot ant loan in the interest of the Government o: 
the borrower. Yithin 15 oavs of the Lender's receipt of SBA's written aecnanc so purchase the guaranteed percentage, 
Lende* shall deliver to SBA a certified transcript of the ioan account showing date and amount o: each advance or 
disbursement and repayment and shal; assign and deiiver to SBA the Loac instruments pursuant to paragraph * above. 
{pott receipt oi these documents, SBA shall pay Lender the guaranteed portion of the amount then owing on the ioar. 
pursuant to paragraph ? above. 
12. Assignment of Interest if* Loon. A. Either party may assign, in whole or part, its rights or obligations unaerth:s 
tgreement or any guaranteed ;oa& with tne prior written consent of the othet party including transfers pursuant tc 
Secondary Participation Agreements '1.* C.F.fc. Part 120 §i20.5(aK$V,. B. Nothing in this agreement prohibits, upon 
written notice to SBA, assignment bv the Lender (or holder of the Note) to other banking institutions provided 'I the 
Lender retains an unguaranteed mtereat ot no: less than IC percent of the outstanding principal amcuot of tne i*an, 
(2) SBA may continue to deal soteiv with tne Lender as to the entire loan Mtii (}« assignee shall have nc greater ::tnt< 
man assignor.C. Nothing in this agreement prohibita Lende:. without notice tcSBA :ro» usinr any gua»an;eed <• *r a-
security for (!) Treasury Tas and Loan Accounts (Treasury Department Circular 92), (2* the deposit of public tunas. 
K$) uninvested trust funds, or (4' discount Dot rowings at the Federal Reserve Bank, provided -a Lenaer nas not sole 
or otherwise assigned any part of the guaranteed ioan, and (b) Lender retains full authority to perform its responsi-
bilities under this agreement. 
13* Terminatioru 
a. Either part* mat- terminate this agreement upon no? less tran K oays written notice oy certi'' *c ma:, tc 
the ©the: parry. Termination sr.al. not ahec: ?n* guaranty or any icar. rrev.:t»usiy authorized by *BA. This sutrara* 
graph is not applitat'.e *t.ere trus agreement applies oniy tc one ces-.gr.ated r>oirowet. 
fc. Lende; may *.•?->!?.«:« rhe gu«an:y as u any urast .gned '->ae tuaraoteed hereunder at any time prior re 
purchase by SPA uren notice *c SBA. "'"-.e fuaraniv or any »:*n shil! be :*rrr.iria:ed if demand for SBA to purcr.ase o-
a request to eitend th» maturity is not rect:Ved by SbA witnir. one >ear after the maturity of the note. 
This agree? em **a" irw- :c the r-taer;: ?:, aad be hinting upon :hr parties, their successors and assigns. 
i* t;l>£SS» f ^ K i C ^ F , ' f \e: jnc SBA r*?e it*%ti this •grr?men: to be duly esecuted the date firs: trorr 
*:::;et. 
_?dcital CUy Bank 
* • * € ' : ? • .*"*. :"EPT 
„..dte£LjL£&. 
*,ifi Caskinette 
;.JTi^nistrat1ve Vice Fresher* 
(Lender shall exs-uu and wbrnit :»•••. copies tc SBA field office.. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA 
SEFTEL, and MICHAEL LANDES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-86-1810 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
: 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, et al., 
t 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
Before the Court is defendant and counterclaimant Capital 
City Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment. The interested parties 
through their counsel appeared and argued their respective posi-
tions. Following argument, the Court took the matter under 
advisement to further consider the Memoranda of Points and Authori-
ties submitted by the parties, and to conduct further legal 
research. The court has now had the opportunity to carefully 
review and consider the arguments and legal authorities cited 
ouones 
by "the parties, review the supporting attachments and affidavits 
of the parties, conduct independent research on the applicable 
case authorities, and being otherwise fully advised, enters 
the following Memorandum Decision. 
In this case the defendant and counterclaimant Capital 
City Bank (hereinafter "Capital") has moved for Summary Judgment 
on plaintiffs1 Complaint seeking dismissal of the plaintiffs1 
Complaint as a matter of law. Capital has also moved for Summary 
Judgment on its Counterclaim against plaintiffs and counterclaim 
defendants, including the plaintiff, the Utah State Tax Commission, 
Crossroads Plaza Associates, Young Electric Sign Company, and 
Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., seeking from the plaintiffs 
the amounts claimed due on their individual guarantees, and 
an Order of foreclosure on the trust deed at issue, and for 
a further Order declaring that the interests of Capital are 
superior to the claims, if any, of the remaining counterclaim 
defendants, to wit: Utah State Tax Commission, Crossroads Plaza 
Associates, Young Electric Sign Company, and Olympus Hills Shopping 
Center, Ltd. 
The issues and arguments in this case have been carefully 
briefed by counsel, and therefore the Court does not undertake 
to review the authorities applicable to the various positions. 
The plaintiffs1 Complaint alleges against Capital in its 
first cause of action that Capital has breached the guarantee 
agr**a*nt #xftcut*d by the plaintiffs in favor of Capital. The 
guarantees were made in furtherance of a note and trust deed 
executed by Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd., (hereinafter "Bagel 
Nosh") in which the plaintiffs were principals. The guarantees 
are absolute, unconditional and personal as to each plaintiff 
in favor of Capital. Bagel Nosh has filed a voluntary Chapter 
XI Bankruptcy Petition. The issues in this case are governed 
by federal law in accordance with the agreements between the 
parties. Federal law is dispositive of the plaintiffs1 first 
cause of action in that under applicable federal decisions from 
the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals the plaintiffs do not have 
an actionable claim for unjustifiable impairment of collateral. 
The Court is further of the opinion that even if Utah law was 
applicable, no breach can be shown, all as more particularly 
set forth by Capital in its Memoranda, the argument on which 
the Court finds persuasive on those issues. 
The plaintiffs1 second cause of action alleges reckless 
loss of a security interest. The materials submitted clearly 
show that Capital perfected its security interests in the col-
lateral. It further appears that plaintiffs1 claim is again 
based upon Utah law which is not applicable under the agreement 
between the parties. Under federal law, Capital has no duty 
to maintain or perfect a security interest in the collateral 
in that the plaintiffs/guarantors have waived that defense. 
00.0 ' " l G 
A* £lui record Is clear that Capital has in fact protected its 
security interests, even if Utah law were applicable, Capital 
has complied. 
Plaintiffs1 third cause of action alleges that the guarantees 
are of no affect, because the underlying obligation was modified. 
Under the terms of the guarantees, modifications have been authorized 
in advance by the plaintiffs/guarantors. Certainly, the modifica-
tions which are in actuality more favorable to the plaintiffs/ 
guarantors cannot be complained of at this point by the guarantors 
where they have paid under the guarantee since the default of 
the principal debtor Bagel Nosh, and if not estopped at this 
point, have impliedly given their consent to modification. 
Accordingly, the plaintiffs/guarantors have waived the defense 
regarding modification, and if they have not so waived that 
defense through the guarantees, they are estopped and have otherwise 
consented to the modification. 
The allegations of "material issues of fact remaining" 
by the plaintiffs are without merit. The claimed factual issues 
either do not actually exist, or if they do exist, they are 
not material and substantial so as to require this Court to 
deny Capitalfs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Sweeping aside all the legalese, the plaintiffs have executed 
unconditional guarantees in favor of Capital to induce a loan 
to their company, Bagel Nosh. Bagel Nosh has defaulted, and 
s 3 ^ ' 
Cipitil^ Jji,entitled to resort to the guarantees which the plaintiffs 
originally made. 
Plaintiffs have further alleged that an indispensable party, 
the Small Business Administration, has not been joined. That 
defense is without merit. In the first instance, the defense 
has not been pled, but additionally, the SBA is not under the 
present interpretation of the Rules of Procedure an indispensable 
party to this action. 
As to the remaining counter defendants, Utah State Tax 
Commission, Crossroads Plaza Associates, Young Electric Sign 
Company, and the Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., to the 
extent that they assert interests in the properties that Capital 
seeks to foreclose, those interests are inferior to Capitalfs. 
The Court concludes that Capital fs Motion for Summary Judgment, 
both as to the plaintiffs1 Complaint, and as to Capital's Counter-
claim should be granted, and that there are no material questions 
of fact existing, and that the defendant and counerclaimant 
Capital is entitled to Judgment as a matter of law. 
For the purposes of Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Court has granted Capital's Motion on all the 
bases alleged by Capital in its moving papers and supporting 
documents, with the exception of the claims of laches, which 
the Court determines would require a further hearing, and are 
not ripe for Summary Judgment. 
Counsel for Capital is to prepare an Order in accordance 
with this Memorandum Decision, and in accordance with Rule 52(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as to the bases granted, 
and submit the same in accordance with the Local Rules of Practice 
for the Court's review and signature. 
Dated this i^ day of F^bruaryl 1987. 
?IMOTHY R. HANSON 
'DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HiNDLEY 
Deputy Cierk 
HftlMflg CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this ^r dav of February, 1987: 
Daniel W. Jackson 
Jeffrey W. Wilkinson 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
175 S. West Temple, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Kerschel J. Saperstein 
Steven T. Waterman 
Attorneys for Def. Capital City Bank 
310 S. Main, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Kent W. Larsen 
Thomas B. Green 
Attorneys for Def. Crossroads Plaza 
185 S. State, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Neil B. Smith 
Attorney for Def. Young Electric Sign 
P.O. Box 25728 
336 South 400 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84125 
Mary Beth Walz 
Assistant Attorney General 
Utah State Tax Commission 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Douglas G. Mortensen, Esq. 
658 East 180 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Prepared and Submitted by: 
Herschel J. Saperstein (2861) 
Steven T. Waterman (4164) 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-3300 
Attorneys for Capital City Bank 
H. Dixon Hjmi'.ey, Clert^ rd Dist Court . 
By fetld^**"*"™ 
^ 1Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL, 
and MICHAEL LANDES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL, 
MICHAEL LANDES, UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, CROSSROADS PLAZA 
ASSOCIATES, a Utah joint venture and 
general partnership, YOUNG ELECTRIC 
SIGN COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
and OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING 
CENTER, LTD., a Utah limited 
partnership, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
Civil No. C86-1810 
(Judge Hanson) 
PARTIAL FINAL 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
OF FORECLOSURE 
The motion of Capital City Bank, Defendant and Counterclaimant, for summary 
judgment in the above-captioned proceeding was, after proper notice, heard before 
this Court on October 27, 1986. In accordance with the Memorandum Decision in 
this proceeding dated February 4, 1987, and in accordance with Rules 52 and 56, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, there being no genuine issue as to any material fact, Capital 
City Bank having established that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as 
more particularly set forth in this Court's Memorandum Decision, the Court specifically 
finding that there is no just reason for delaying entry of this judgment as final and 
good cause otherwise appearing, this Court enters its judgment and decree of 
foreclosure as follows: 
1. It is hereby adjudged and decreed that the absolute, personal, and 
unconditional guaranty of Sidney Seftel and Theresa Seftel, Plaintiffs and Counterclaim 
Defendants, executed on or about December 24, 1979, and the absolute, personal, 
and unconditional guaranty of Michael Landes, Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant, 
executed on or about December 24, 1979, are valid, subsisting obligations of Sidney 
Seftel, Theresa Seftel, and Michael Landes. 
2. Capital City Bank is granted judgment against Sidney Seftel, Theresa 
Seftel, and Michael Landes, jointly and severally, in the amount of $293,319.64 as 
of February 15, 1987, plus interest on that sum after February 15, 1987, at the contract 
rate of 11 3/4% per annum compounded annually until said sum is paid in full. 
3. The judgment granted herein is final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and the clerk is expressly directed to enter judgment as final. 
4. In as much as Capital City Bank has elected to treat the trust deed 
executed by Michael Landes on or about December 24, 1979, as a mortgage for purposes 
of foreclosure, the real property described in the trust deed is subject to a mortgage 
GOO^G 
lien in favor of Capital City Bank which real property is situated in Salt Lake County 
and described as follows: 
Units 616, 617, and S-616 of THE LODGE AT SNOWBIRD, according 
to the record of survey map filed for record as Entry No. 2411463 in 
Book "KKft of Plats, at page 5, together with a 1.16% undivided ownership 
interest in the common areas and facilities according to the Declaration 
of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, and the Exhibits attached 
thereto, recorded September 28, 1971, as Entry No. 2412081 in Book 
3001, at pages 808-817 of Official Records. EXCEPTING, however, 
from the common area all mineral or underground rights and being limited 
to the surface rights only. 
5. The mortgage lien in favor of Capital City Bank referenced in paragraph 
4 of this order is prior, senior, and superior to the claims, liens, and interests of the 
Utah State Tax Commission, Crossroad Plaza Associates, Young Electric Sign Company, 
Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., and all persons claiming by, through, or under 
each of them. 
6. In as much as Capital City Bank has elected to treat the trust deed 
executed by Sidney Seftel and Theresa Seftel on or about December 24, 1979, as a 
mortgage for purposes of foreclosure, the real property described in the trust deed 
is subject to a mortgage lien in favor of Capital City Bank which real property is 
situated in Salt Lake County and described as follows: 
Units 705, 706, and S-705 of THE LODGE AT SNOWBIRD, according 
to the record of survey map filed for record as Entry No. 2411463 in 
Book ffKKff of Plats, at page 5, together with a 1.16% undivided ownership 
interest in the common areas and facilities according to the Declaration 
of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, and the Exhibits attached 
thereto, recorded September 28, 1971, as Entry No. 2412081 in Book 
3001, at pages 808-817 of Official Records, and amended by Amendment 
to Condominium Declaration of The Lodge at Snowbird recorded October 
26, 1977, as Entry No« 3014973 in Book 4569 at page 1149 through 1258 
and re-recorded December 16, 1977, as Entry No. 3039149 of Official 
Records. EXCEPTING, however, from the common area all mineral 
or underground rights, and being limited to the surface rights only. 
7. The mortgage lien in favor of Capital City Bank referenced in paragraph 
6 of this order is prior, senior, and superior to the claims, liens, and interests of the 
i n i t i o ;;.<*• 
Utah State Tax Commission, Crossroad Plaza Associates, Young Electric Sign Company, 
Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., all persons claiming by, through, or under each 
of them, and all persons having liens, interests, and claims subsequent to December 
27, 1979, including the lien of John N. Whiteley, Barbara Whiteley, and Elan 
Management, Inc., pursuant to a judgment of this Court in Civil No. C85-6571 dated 
August 27, 1986. 
8. Capital City Bank is granted a judgment foreclosing the mortgage 
liens referenced in paragraphs 4 and 6 herein and ordering and directing that each 
of the real properties described in paragraphs 4 and 6 herein be advertised and publicly 
sold by or under the direction of the sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in 
accordance with the law with the parcel described in paragraph 4 being sold first 
followed by sale of the parcel described in paragraph 6, that the sales be subject 
to the redemption rights of any party in accordance with the applicable law but that 
the purchasers at the sales are given the right of possession of the real properties 
pending the period of redemption including the right to receive the rents, profits, 
and issues derived therefrom. 
9. From the proceeds of the sale to be conducted by the sheriff in 
accordance with paragraph 8 herein, the sheriff shall first retain his fees and then 
pay to Capital City Bank or its attorneys, the total amount adjudged by this Court 
in paragraph 2 herein to be due and owing by Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, and Michael 
Landes, with interest thereon at the rate of 11 3/4% per annum compounded annually 
until paid together with the costs and expenses of sale and all other costs, including 
attorneys' fees as approved by order of this Court or so much of the judgment as 
the proceeds will pay and that the sheriff obtain & receipt for the amount paid and 
return the same to this Court together with a report of the sale conducted pursuant 
to paragraph 8 herein. 
000?i:Q 
10. After payment in full of all sums adjudged due and owing to Capital 
City Bank, the unexpended and undisbursed remaining balance, if any, shall be deposited 
by the sheriff into the registry of this Court together with a report of the sale 
conducted pending further order of this Court. 
11. In the event the sales of the real properties in accordance with 
paragraph 8 herein yield insufficient proceeds to satisfy the amounts adjudged herein 
to be due and owing by Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, and Michael Landes to Capital 
City Bank, then a deficiency judgment may be entered against Sidney Seftel, Theresa 
Seftel, and Michael Landes jointly and severally for the deficiency remaining. 
12. Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, Michael Landes, and all persons claiming 
by, through, or under each of them, and all persons (including but not limited to the 
Utah State Tax Commission, Crossroads Plaza Associates, Young Electric Sign 
Company, Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., John N. Whiteley, Barbara Whiteley, 
and Elan Management, Inc.) having liens or encumbrances recorded subsequent to 
December 27, 1979, upon the real properties described in paragaphs 4 and 6 herein 
and all persons claiming any interest in those real properties subsequent to the notices 
of lis pendens filed by Capital City Bank on those properties, are forever barred and 
foreclosed from all equity of redemption and claim of, in, and to those real properties 
from and after delivery of the sheriffs deeds, upon expiration of the period of 
redemption. 
13. Capital City Bank is granted judgment against Sidney Seftel, Theresa 
Seftel, and Michael Landes dismissing all claims of the complaint filed against Capital 
City Bank. 
14. The remaining issues relative to the award and proper amount of 
attorneys' fees to be awarded Capital City Bank are to be determined by further 
orders of this Court. 
OOCXTSS 
DATED this JO day of May, 1987. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Darnel W. Jackson 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
BY THE COURT 
A 
r * \L— 
Pimothy R. Hanson 
/District Court Judge 
I.DIXONHINDlEY 
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ATTORNEY'S CERTIFICATE 
In accordance with Rule 4, Supplementary Rules of Practice — Third Judicial 
District, I, Steven T. Waterman, attorney for Capital City Bank, hereby certify that 
on the /S day of May, 1987, I served the foregoing Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure upon the following by depositing copies thereof in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Daniel W. Jackson 
175 South Main, Suite 560 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Kent W. Larsen 
Thomas B. Green 
LARSEN, KIMBALL, PARR <5c CROCKETT 
185 South State, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Neil B. Smith 
P.O. Box 25728 
336 South 400 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84125 
Mary Beth Walz 
Assistant Attorney General 
Utah State Tax Commission 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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Douglas G. Mortensen 
MATHESON, JEPPSON & MORTENSEN 
658 East 180 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
John Whiteley 
Barbara Whiteley 
Elan Management, Inc. 
2676 Skyline Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Lisa W. Bennett 
3077 First City Tower 
Houston, Texas 77002-6760 
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Due to our decision herein, we need not 
reach the parties' other arguments on ap-
peal. The orders granting summary judg-
ment and Zions' motion to dismiss are va-
cated, and the case is remanded for pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
HOWE, Associate C.J., and 
STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (concurring in 
the result). 
I agree that this case should be remand-
ed to the trial court because there were 
adequate allegations in the complaints to 
warrant further proceedings, under either 
tort or contract rubric, that could lead to 
the recovery of the damages spelled out in 
section 70A-4-103 of the Commercial Code. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-103 (1981); 
U.C.C. § 4-103 (1978). However, I would 
make it clear that the question of whether 
the bank failed to act in good faith is quite 
a different issue than whether it failed to 
exercise ordinary care. 
Section 70A-4-103 governs the remedies 
available in this case as a result of either a 
failure to exercise ordinary care or actions 
taken in bad faith. Section 70A-4-103(5) 
permits the collection of consequential (but 
not punitive) damages when "bad faith" is 
shown, but when nothing more is proven 
than a "failure to exercise ordinary care," 
one may recover only "the amount of the 
item reduced by an amount which could not 
have been realized by the use of ordinary 
care."l Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-103(5) 
(1981). The concepts of "good faith" and 
its opposite, "bad faith," as well as that of 
"ordinary care," should not be casually 
smeared together under the rubric of 
"good faith and ordinary care," as the ma-
jority appears to do at places in its opinion. 
This sort of casual use of terminology in-
vites conceptual misunderstandings by the 
Bar, trial courts, and juries. In articulat-
ing the law, we should do so with some 
analytical precision. That is one of our 
1. Because the damages specified in section 70A-
4-103(5) are specially tailored for UCC viola-
tions and are more limited than what might be 
available at common law, the result of this 
statutory tailoring of damages is to make the 
primary obligations as an appellate court. 
See Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 785 
(Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring in 
part, joined by Hall, C.J., Howe, A.C.J., and 
Stewart, J.). 
f O 5 KEY NUMBIR SYSTEM/ 
Sidney SEFTEL, Theresa Seftel, and 
Michael Landes, Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
v. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, Defendant and 
Respondent. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, Counterclaimant, 
v. 
Sidney SEFTEL, Theresa Seftel, Michael 
Landes, Utah State Tax Commission, 
Crossroads Plaza Associates, a Utah 
joint venture and general partnership, 
Young Electric Sign Company, a Utah 
corporation, and Olympus Hills Shop-
ping Center, LTD., a Utah limited part-
nership, Counterclaim Defendants. 
No. 870312-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Jan. 12, 1989. 
Rehearing Denied January 31, 1989. 
Guarantors under note brought declar-
atory action against payee seeking order 
discharging them from obligations under 
the guaranties. Creditor counterclaimed to 
enforce guaranties. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Timothy R. Han-
son, J., granted summary judgment in fa-
vor of payee. Guarantors appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held that: (1) 
colender was not an indispensable party to 
contract or tort designation of the cause of 
action rather academic. Cf. Beck v. Farmers' 
Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801-02 (Utah 1985) 
(comparing range of damages available in tort 
and contract). 
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the case, where there was uncontroverted 
evidence that colender had authorized lend-
er to sue on note and related guaranties, 
and (2) guarantors waived right, under 
guaranty agreement, to raise defense of 
impairment of collateral. 
Affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error <s=>187(3) 
Parties <s=»80(l), 84(1) 
Party to a lawsuit may raise the issue 
of failure to join an indispensable party at 
any time in the proceedings, including for 
the first time on appeal. Rules Civ.Proc, 
„ Rule 19(a). 
Y* 2. Appeal and Error <3=»1036(3) 
D Trial court's failure to follow two-step 
«^  analysis, required under procedural rule to 
L determine if colender in a suit to enforce 
'^ note guaranties was an indispensable par-
ty, was harmless error, where there was 
'J clear evidence supporting court's ultimate 
**« conclusion that colender was not indispens-
able party. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 19. 
h 
jr 3. Contracts <3=>330(1) 
As a general contract rule, joint obli-
gees are deemed indispensable parties in a 
suit against obligor. 
4. Guaranty <3=>82(2) 
Colender under note was not indispens-
able party in action brought to enforce 
guaranties of note, where uncontroverted 
affidavit evidence from lender indicated co-
lender authorized suit on note and related 
guaranties and acceleration of their maturi-
ties. 
5. Guaranty <s=>62 
Ordinarily, when a creditor, by his ac-
tions, impairs the value of collateral secur-
ing the underlying obligation, either abso-
lute or conditional, guaranteed by guaran-
tor, guarantor will be discharged from his 
obligation to extent of impairment. 
6. Guaranty <3»72 
Guarantors under loan agreement 
waived rights to assert defenses of impair-
ment of collateral or modification of under-
lying obligation, under terms of guaranty 
agreement, which provided for guarantors' 
consent to release or discharge of collateral 
and provided guarantors no recourse in the 
event of such actions. 
7. Guaranty <3=*72 
There was no evidence, in action to 
enforce guaranties of note, that lender's 
actions were ''willful," so as to preclude 
waiver of impairment of collateral defense 
under guaranties relating to a Small Busi-
ness Administration financed loan. 
Daniel W. Jackson (argued), Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiffs and appellants. 
David M. Connors (argued), LeBoeuf, 
Lamb, Leiby & McRae, Salt Lake City, for 
Landes. 
Steven T. Waterman (argued), Herschel 
J. Saperstein, Marco B. Kunz, Watkiss & 
Campbell, Salt Lake City, for defendant 
and respondent. 
Before BILLINGS, JACKSON and 
ORME, JJ. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Plaintiffs/appellants, Sidney Seftel, 
Theresa Seftel, and Michael Landes, 
("guarantors") appeal from the trial court's 
summary judgment dismissing their com-
plaint and granting defendant/respondent, 
Capital City Bank, ("Capital") judgment in 
the amount of $293,319.64 and issuing a 
decree of foreclosure. Guarantors seek a 
reversal of the trial court's order. We 
affirm. 
FACTS 
On December 24,1979, Bagel Nosh Inter-
mountain, Ltd., ("Bagel Nosh") executed a 
note in favor of Capital in the principal 
amount of $300,000. Under the terms of 
the note, the Small Business Administra-
tion ("SBA") was a 90% participating lend-
er. The note also provides it is to be en-
forced in "accordance with applicable fed-
eral law." 
As additional consideration for the loan, 
guarantors each executed unconditional 
personal guaranties. The guaranties were 
secured by trust deeds to real property 
SEFTEL v. CAPITAL CITY BANK 
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owned by guarantors and located at Snow-
bird. The guaranties were executed on 
SBA forms in favor of both the SBA and 
Capital as "co-lenders." Specifically, the 
guaranties state: 
In order to induce Capital City Bank and 
SBA (hereinafter called "Lender") to 
make a loan . . . to Bagel Nosh Inter-
mountain, LTD. (Inc.) . . . (hereinafter 
called the "Debtor"), the Undersigned 
hereby unconditionally guarantees to 
Lender, . . . the due and punctual pay-
ment when due, . . . of the principal of 
and interest on and all sums payable . . . 
with respect to the note of the Debt-
or 
The Undersigned waives any notice of 
the incurring by the Debtor at any 
time of any of the Liabilities, and 
waives any and all presentment, de-
mand, proiest or notice of dishonor, 
nonpayment, or other default with re-
spect to any of the Liabilities The 
Undersigned hereby grants to Lender 
full power, in its uncontrolled discre-
tion and without notice to the under-
signed . . . , to deal in any manner with 
the Liabilities and the collateral, in-
cluding, . . . the following powers: 
(a) To modify or otherwise change any 
terms of all or any part of the Liabili-
ties . . . to grant any extension or re-
newal thereof . . . and to effect any 
release, compromise or settlement with 
respect thereto; 
(d) To consent to the substitution, ex-
change, or release of all or any part of 
the collateral 
The obligations of the Undersigned 
hereunder shall not be released, dis-
charged, or in any way affected, nor 
shall the Undersigned have any rights 
or recourse against Lender, by reason 
of any action Lender may take or omit 
to take under the foregoing powers. 
On March 30, 1983, following several 
months of nonpayment, Bagel Nosh and 
Capital entered into a Loan Restructure 
Agreement ("Agreement") modifying the 
terms of the original note. The Agreement 
was signed by Sidney Seftel and provided 
in relevant part: 
Capital . . . agrees to modify the terms 
of the loan agreement dated December 
24, 1979, between [Capital] and [Bagel 
Nosh] under the following conditions: 
5. Sidney Seftel and Michael Landes 
personally guarantee [Capital's] loan 
to the Borrower. Each is personally 
liable for the entire indebtedness to 
[Capital].... 
6. Any item in the loan agreement dat-
ed December 24, 1979, that is not spe-
cifically modified by this loan restruc-
ture agreement remains in full force. 
Guarantors complied with the terms of 
the Agreement and made several payments 
thereunder. 
On November 29, 1984, Bagel Nosh filed 
a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of 
the Bankruptcy Code. On March 11, 1986, 
guarantors filed this action for declaratory 
relief requesting the trial court to dis-
charge them from any obligations under 
their personal guaranties on the grounds 
that Capital, (1) willfully impaired the col-
lateral originally pledged to secure the 
note, (2) recklessly lost their security, and 
(3) substantially modified guarantors' obli-
gations underlying the guaranties by the 
Loan Restructure Agreement. 
Capital counterclaimed requesting the 
trial court to declare the guaranties and 
corresponding trust deeds valid enforceable 
obligations. Capital further requested a 
judicial decree of foreclosure on the trust 
deeds. 
On July 25, 1986, Capital filed a motion 
for summary judgment on the issues in 
guarantors' complaint and Capital's coun-
terclaim. Capital claimed the note, Agree-
ment, and guaranties were all in default. 
Capital argued the guaranties were en-
forceable, thus, they were entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law because, (1) pursu-
ant to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-301 (1978), 
as holder of the guaranties, Capital was 
entitled to enforce them, (2) guarantors by 
prior judicial admissions were estopped 
from denying liability, and (3) under the 
express provisions of the guaranties, guar-
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antors waived the defenses set forth in 
their complaint. 
In support of its motion for summary 
judgment, Capital submitted, among a 
number of documents, the affidavit of M.A. 
Allem, Capital's executive vice president. 
In his affidavit, Mr. Allem states in perti-
nent part that the "SBA is a participating 
lender in the loan of Capital City to Bagel 
Nosh to the extent of ninety percent (90%) 
of the outstanding unpaid balance." 
On September 5, 1986, Capital filed the 
supplemental affidavit of Mr. Allem which 
stated: 
5. Capital City is entitled to sue upon 
the loan instruments including acceler-
ation of the maturity of the note and 
guaranties provided Capital City has 
obtained the written consent of SBA. 
6. Capital City is the legal holder of the 
note and guaranties involved in this 
action, and Capital City has not trans-
ferred the note or guaranties to SBA 
and has been authorized in writing by 
SBA to sue upon the note and guaran-
ties 
On September 11, 1986, guarantors filed 
their memorandum in opposition to Capi-
tal's motion for summary judgment claim-
ing for the first time that the SBA was an 
indispensable party, and thus must be 
joined in order for Capital to enforce the 
guaranties. 
On February 4, 1987, the trial court is-
sued its memorandum decision granting 
summary judgment in favor of Capital on 
all issues in the complaint and counter-
claim. Guarantors appeal this order. 
I. 
RULE 19—INDISPENSABLE PARTIES 
In its memorandum decision, the trial 
court found that Capital was entitled to 
enforce the guaranties and the SBA was 
not an indispensable party. Although we 
1. The portion of Utah RXiv.P. 19 upon which 
guarantors rely provides: 
A person . . . shall be joined as a party in 
the action if . . . (2) he claims an interest in 
the subject matter and is so situated that his 
absence may . . . (ii) leave any of the persons 
find the trial court did not properly analyze 
the issue of whether the SBA is an indis-
pensable party, we affirm the trial court's 
decision as we find based upon the undis-
puted facts in the record, the SBA is not, 
as a matter of law, an indispensable party. 
Required Analysis Under Rule 19 
In its February 4th memorandum deci-
sion the trial court stated: 
Plaintiffs have further alleged that an 
indispensable party, the Small Business 
Administration, has not been joined. 
That defense is without merit. In the 
first instance, the defense has not been 
pled, but additionally, the SBA is not 
under the present interpretation of the 
Rules of Procedure an indispensable par-
ty to this action. 
[1] Guarantors claim the trial court 
committed reversible error by permitting 
Capital to enforce the guaranties without 
making particularized findings pursuant to 
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.1 While actual findings of fact were 
not strictly required as this matter was 
presented on a motion for summary judg-
ment, the guarantors' basic contention is 
well-taken. We note that Rule 19 of the 
Utah Rules is substantively similar to its 
federal counterpart, see Utah R.Civ.P. 19 
compiler's notes, and in the absence of 
Utah authority, we resort to the more 
abundant federal case law for guidance. 
We also note that a party may raise the 
issue of failure to join an indispensable 
party at any time in the proceedings, in-
cluding for the first time on appeal. See, 
e.g., Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc. v. 
Pitterich, 805 F.2d 96, 104 (3rd Cir.1986). 
Accordingly, this issue is properly before 
us. 
Ordinarily, a trial court's determination 
properly entered under Rule 19 will not be 
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. 
See, e.g., Bonneville Tower v. Thompson 
already parties subject to a substantial risk of 
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise in-
consistent obligations by reason of his 
claimed interest. 
Utah R.Civ.P. 19(a). 
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Michie Assocs., 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 
1986); Navajo Tribe of Indians v. New 
Mexico, 809 F.2d 1455, 1471 (10th Cir.1987); 
Walsh v. Centeio, 692 F.2d 1239, 1241 (9th 
Cir.1982). Whether a party is indispens-
able to the action depends on a number 
of factors all "varying with the different 
rases, some such factors being substantive, 
some procedural, some compelling by them-
selves, and some subject to balancing 
against opposing interests." Provident 
Tradesmens B. & T. Co. v. Patterson, 390 
U.S. 102, 119, 88 S.Ct. 733, 743, 19 L.Ed.2d 
936 (1968).2 
[2] Federal authorities addressing the 
analytical requirements of Rule 19 uni-
formly require a court to follow a two-part 
inquiry. See, e.g., Ogalalla Land Ltd. v. 
Wexpro Co., 587 F.Supp. 453, 454 (D.Wyo. 
1984) (citing Wright v. First Nat'l Bank, 
483 F.2d 73 (10th Cir.1973)). Pursuant to 
subsection (a), "a court must first deter-
mine whether an absent party has suffi-
cient interest in the action to make it a 
necessary party," considering the criteria 
set forth in the Rule.3 Manygoats v. 
Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 558 (10th Cir.1977). 
If, after the appropriate analysis, a party is 
deemed "necessary," a court must then 
proceed to subsection (b), and determine 
whether the party is indispensable, consid-
ering four factors: (1) to what extent a 
judgment rendered in the person's absence 
will prejudice him or her or those already 
parties; (2) the likelihood of reducing or 
avoiding prejudice by protective measures 
or provisions in the judgment; (3) the ade-
quacy of the judgment which might be 
entered in the person's absence; and (4) the 
adequacy of the plaintiffs remedy if the 
2. Provident is the landmark case interpreting 
Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and it has been cited with approval in a number 
of Utah decisions. See, e.g., Hiltsley v. Ryder, 
738 P.2d 1024, 1025 n. 3 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Toledo, 699 P.2d 710, 711 n. 4 (Utah 1985); 
Sanpete County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Price 
River Water Users Assoc., 652 P.2d 1302, 1306 n. 
5 (Utah 1982). 
3. Utah R.Civ.P. 19(a) identifies the criteria a 
court must consider when determining whether 
a party is necessary and provides: 
(a) Persons to be Joined if feasible. A person 
who is subject to service of process and whose 
action is dismissed for nonjoinder. See 
Utah R.Civ.P. 19(b). See also Wright v. 
First Nat'l Bank of Altus, Oklahoma, 
483 F.2d 73, 75 (10th Cir.1973). In light of 
these factors, the ultimate test under Rule 
19(b) is "whether in equity and good con-
science the action should proceed." Many-
goats, 558 F.2d at 558. 
Furthermore, abstract generalizations 
are not a substitute for the analysis re-
quired under Rule 19. Provident, 390 U.S. 
at 124, 88 S.Ct. at 745. 
The trial court in this action did not 
follow the analytical steps required by Rule 
19. The court failed to address the two-
step analysis set forth above to demon-
strate that the undisputed facts support its 
ultimate conclusion. Instead, the trial 
court merely stated that "the SBA is not 
under the present interpretation of the 
Rules of Procedure an indispensable party 
to this action." Such conclusory state-
ments do not comply with the rule. See, 
e.g., Provident, 390 U.S. at 124, 88 S.Ct. at 
745; Wright, 483 F.2d at 75. As the Court 
declared in Wright, "[t]hese conclusionary 
statements are of no value because the 
court finds no facts to support them." 483 
F.2d at 75. (the trial court in Wright 
stated "complete relief cannot be afforded 
the remaining parties for all the reasons 
set out in Rule 19"). 
However, a trial court's failure to follow 
the two-step inquiry under Rule 19 is harm-
less error, if, upon a review of the record, 
there is clear evidence to support the trial 
court's ultimate conclusion. See Acton v. 
Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1987). 
joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction 
over the subject matter of action shall be joined 
as a party in the action if (1) in his absence 
complete relief cannot be accorded among those 
already parties, or (2) he claims an interest 
relating to the subject of the action and is so 
situated that the disposition of the action in his 
absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or 
impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) 
leave any of the persons already parties subject 
to a substantial risk of incurring double, multi-
ple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by rea-
son of his claimed interest 
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[3,4] As a general contract rule, joint 
obligees are deemed indispensable parties 
in a suit against an obligor. See, e.g., 
Brackin Tie, Lumber & Chip Co. v. 
McLarty Farms, Inc., 704 F.2d 585, 586 
(11th Cir.1983) (a review of the case law 
reveals that the majority of courts hold 
joint obligees are indispensable); Harrell 
and Sumner Contracting Co. v. Peabody 
Petersen Co., 546 F.2d 1227, 1229 (5th Cir. 
1977); Bry-Man's, Inc. v. Stute, 312 F.2d 
585, 587 (5th Cir.1963); Purcel v. Wells, 
236 F.2d 469, 472 (10th Cir.1956); Fremon 
v. W.A. Sheaffer Pen Co., 209 F.2d 627, 
633-34 (8th Cir.1954); Hanna Mining Co. 
v. Minnesota Power and Light Co., 573 
F.Supp. 1395,1399 (D.Minn.1983). See also 
C. Wright, A. Miller, and M. Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, § 1613 at 185-86 
(2d ed.1986). Joint obligees are ordinarily 
considered indispensable because "[obli-
gors have a 'right to stand upon their con-
tract and insist that they shall not be ha-
rassed with different actions or suits to 
recover parts of one single demand/" 
Bry-Mans, 312 F.2d at 587 (citation omit-
ted), (quoting McAulay v. Moody, 185 F. 
144 (CC.0re.1911)). 
Capital contends that the undisputed 
facts in the record demonstrate there is no 
possibility of multiple lawsuits because the 
SBA has no legal interest in and, therefore, 
cannot enforce the guaranties. Capital ar-
gues on appeal that the SBA is not a party 
to the underlying note and has not funded 
any portion of the loan to Bagel Nosh. 
Furthermore, Capital claims that the SBA 
has given Capital written authorization to 
sue on the guaranties. Therefore, Capital 
claims the SBA is not, as a matter of law, 
an indispensable party. To support its alle-
gations, Capital directs our attention to the 
affidavit of M.A. Allem which states that 
"Capital City is the legal holder of the note 
and guaranties involved in this action and 
has been authorized in writing by the SBA 
to sue upon the note and guaranties and 
accelerate the maturity thereof." 
No objection was made below to this 
affidavit and no counter affidavit was filed, 
thus we accept the factual allegations as 
true on appeal. See Trimble Real Estate 
v. Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 451, 455 
(Utah Ct.App.lS88); Salt Lake City Corp. 
v. James Constructors Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 
46 (Utah CtApp.1988). Accordingly, Mr. 
Allem's affidavit establishes that the SBA 
has given Capital written authorization to 
sue upon the note and the guaranties, and 
thus, based on the undisputed facts before 
us is not an indispensable party. 
We do not, however, suggest that absent 
such authorization by the SBA, the SBA 
would necessarily be an indispensable par-
ty. Although the guaranties expressly run 
to both Capital and the SBA, suggesting at 
first blush that both would be indispens-
able to any action seeking enforcement of 
the guaranties, the only obligation guaran-
tied is the $300,000 note, which is payable 
by Bagel Nosh solely to Capital. So long 
as Capital is the holder of the note, as a 
matter of ordinary commercial law there is 
no obligation due under the note from Ba-
gel Nosh to the SBA and, seemingly, no 
underlying obligation of Bagel Nosh which 
the guarantors can be said to have guaran-
tied to the SBA. However, federal law and 
extensive federal regulation govern these 
transactions which might conceivably re-
quire a different analysis but one we need 
not reach in this case to find that the SBA 
is not an indispensable party as a matter of 
law. Accordingly, we affirm the trial 
court's determination. 
II. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING 
GUARANTORS' COMPLAINT 
To determine whether summary judg-
ment was properly entered, we employ the 
same analytical standard as that of the 
trial court. Because summary judgment 
deprives a party of its opportunity to 
present its case on the merits, we review 
the facts and inferences in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom the 
judgment was granted. Atlas Corp. v. 
Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 
1987). If, after a review of the record, we 
conclude that a genuine issue of material 
fact exists, we must reverse the summary 
judgment and remand for further proceed-
ings on that issue. Id. 
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After a careful review of the record in 
this case, we conclude the guarantors have 
failed to raise genuine issues of material 
fact and, as a matter of law, their defenses 
must fail. Accordingly, we affirm the trial 
court's order dismissing guarantors' com-
plaint. 
Impairment of Collateral 
[5-7] We first address whether guaran-
tors waived their right to assert the de-
fense of "impairment of collateral." Based 
on the express terms of the original guar-
anties dated December 24, 1979, we con-
clude guarantors waived this defense. 
Ordinarily, when a creditor, by his ac-
tions, impairs the value of collateral secur-
ing the underlying obligation guaranteed 
by a guarantor, "either absolute or condi-
tional, the guarantor will be discharged 
from his obligation to the extent of the 
impairment." Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Rite Way Concrete Forming, Inc., 742 
P.2d 105, 108-09 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (cita-
tion omitted). A guarantor may, however, 
expressly waive his or her right to raise the 
defense of impairment of collateral. Id. at 
109. See also Continental Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Utah Sec. Mortgage, Inc., 701 P.2d 
1095, 1097 (Utah 1985); Heller v. United 
States Rock Wool Co., 93 Utah Adv.Rep. 8, 
9 (Utah Ct.App.1988). 
The provisions of the SBA guaranty 
agreements, signed by each of the guaran-
tors, expressly waive an impairment de-
fense: 
[Guarantors] . . . consent to the substitu-
tion, exchange, or release of all or any 
part of the collateral— 
The obligation of . . . [Guarantors] shall 
not be released, discharged, or in any 
way affected, nor shall the [Guarantors] 
have any rights or recourse against [Cap-
ital], by reason of any action [Capital] 
may take or omit to take under the fore-
going powers. 
This language is clear and unequivocal 
waiver and release of their rights in the 
collateral. The Tenth Circuit, interpreting 
the identical provisions of an SBA guaran-
ty, has similarly held that this provision 
amounts to a waiver by guarantors of their 
right to claim impairment of collateral. 
See United States v. New Mexico Land-
scaping, Inc., 785 F.2d 843, 846-47 (10th 
Cir.1986). 
We are not persuaded by guarantors' 
allegations that Capital acted "willfully." 
We are mindful that parties to an SBA 
guaranty do not waive an impairment of 
collateral defense where the acts of a lend-
er are deemed "willful." See New Mexico 
Landscaping, 785 F.2d at 847-48. In or-
der to demonstrate the requisite "willful-
ness" "a guarantor must allege more than 
'gross neglect of a known duty.'" Id. at 
848. "A guarantor . . . must allege 'a pur-
pose by the [Lender] to diminish the value 
of the security in order to intentionally 
injure the defendants.'" Id. 
Guarantors in this action have not al-
leged in their original complaint such a 
purpose by Capital, nor did they submit 
affidavits to support such a position. 
Thus, we find no error in the trial court's 
order granting summary judgment on their 
impairment of collateral defense. 
Reckless Loss of 
Security/Modification of Obligation 
We further find guarantors' remaining 
defenses, reckless loss of security and mod-
ification of the underlying obligation were 
properly dismissed. Guarantors have 
failed to demonstrate that Capital did not 
maintain a perfected security interest in 
the collateral at all relevant times. Fur-
thermore, even if guarantors could identify 
some technical transgression in Capital's 
security interest, the language of the guar-
anties previously identified in this opinion 
clearly constitute a waiver of said trans-
gressions. 
Finally, we reject guarantors' conten-
Guarantors have expressly consented to a tions that they are discharged from their 
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obligations by reason of the Loan Restruc-
ture Agreement. Once again, the clear and 
unequivocal language of the guaranties 
empowers Capital "to modify or otherwise 
change any terms of all or any part" of the 
agreement. 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the 
trial court's summary judgment in favor of 
Capital. 
JACKSON and ORME, JJ., concur. 
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